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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the National 
League of Cities case has profound implications for the relation-
ship between the federal government and state and local govern-
ments. While it will dramatically alter the federal/state rela-
tionship in several respects, the new standard of "state sover-
eignty" relied upon in the decision means that it will be a long 
time before we can determine its full implications with cer-
tainty.1 
Though many now assume in view of National League of 
Cities v. Usery2 that a federal bargaining law regulating state and 
local employees is doomed, others are more cautious and suggest 
that "doom is too hard a word because the mind of the legislator 
can be very creative. "3 Whether the holding in that case precludes 
federal regulation is the subject of this article. Various constitu-
tional bases for future legislation are explored and analyzed with 
the understanding that the judiciary has shown a propensity for 
permitting by one legal avenue what is denied by another. As will 
be discussed, though the front door for legislation under the com-
merce clause may be closed or partially closed, the back door 
remains wide open under the spending power of article I, section 
8, clause 1 and the fourteenth·amendment, to accomplish perhaps 
indirectly what cannot be done directly. Therein lies the dilemma 
for those seeking federal legislation regulating state and local 
employees; assuming arguendo that the political judgment of 
Congress would favor such legislation, what would be a constitu-
tionally permissible means to implement it following the 
National League of Cities case? 
Federal intervention into state and local labor relations has 
1. Statement of Undersecretary of Labor Michael Moskow addressing the U.S. Con-
ference of Mayors in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June 30, 1976, [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. 
(BNA) 664: B-15. 
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The holding in National League of Cities is discussed in the 
text accompanying notes 12-14 & 129-40 infra. 
3. Statement of Solicitor of Labor William J. Kilberg, [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. 
(BNA) 668: B-6. The fires of legislative creativity will most likely be kindled by the 
determination of unions to pass bargaining legislation notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court ruling. For example, John Ryor, President of the National Education Association 
[hereinafter referred to as NEAl promised at a recent convention that the National 
League of Cities should prepare for battle because the decision will cause the NEA to 
redouble its efforts in Congress once a legislative way to avoid the Court's decision is 
found. ld. 664 at B-11. 
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been a subject of debate for years.4 Arguments deal with whether 
or not the public employer is significantly different from the pri-
vate employer so as to require different treatment under an 
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act5 [hereinafter 
referred to as NLRA] or under other alternatives such as the 
establishment of minimum standards or separate legislation. 
Additionally, opponents of such federal legislation argue that 
there is a lack of significant experience at the state and local 
government levels in public sector labor relations. Therefore, in 
view of the diverse and complex legislative, fiscal, and political 
structures of the states, federal legislation is premature. 6 A final 
area of disagreement centers on whether it is appropriate under 
our federalist system to devise and impose national uniform legis-
lation on the sovereign states or, instead, to permit the choice of 
engaging in public sector collective bargaining to be made by 
each state as a part of its sovereign right. 
Strong and persuasive arguments can be made on both sides 
of the issues. However, the fact remains that, as of this date, only 
thirty-seven states have chosen to pass some kind of public sector 
bargaining legislation covering some but not all of their employ-
ees.7 Many of these laws are noncomprehensive and were passed 
in direct response to the special urging of interest groups.8 Inter-
estingly, public employees in states without legislation and pub-
lic employees excluded from legislative coverage are not necessar-
ily without collective bargaining. In many states, the judiciary 
has generously provided the authority for legally enforceable 
agreements reached under de facto, extra-legal bargaining ar-
rangements on the basis of implied authority.9 
4. See Brown, Federal Legislation for Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A Mini-
mum Standards Approach, 5 U. ToL. L. REv. 681 (1974). 
5. McCann & Smiley, The National Labor Relations Act and the Regulation of Pub-
lic Employee Collective Bargaining, 13 HARv. J. LEGIS. 479 (1976). 
6. Hearings on H.R. 12532, H.R. 7684, and H.R. 9324 Before the Special Subcomm. 
on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1972) 
(statement by former Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson) [hereinafter cited as 1972 
Hearings]. 
7. See Nolan, Public Employee Unionism in the Southeast: The Legal Parameters, 
29 S.C.L. REv. 235 (1977) and Pegnetter & Hayford, State Employee Grievances and Due 
Process: An Analysis of Contract Arbitration and Civil Service Review Systems, 29 S.C.L. 
REv 0 305 (1977) 0 
8. See generally McCann & Smiley, note 5 supra, at 495-506. 
9. Compare Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 
2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975) with Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington, 217 Va. 
558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977). 
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Paralleling this increased recognition of bargaining rights for 
public employees through legislative or judicial means has been 
the tremendous growth in the number of public employees and 
their membership in unions. 10 These taken together have given 
the issue of public sector collective bargaining for state and local 
employees a national dimension prompting congressional hear~ 
ings on federallegislation.U The controversy continued with labor 
and management groups preparing for battle in Congress until 
the National League of Cities case, 12 testing the applicability of 
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act13 [hereinafter referred to 
as FLSA] to state employees, went to the Supreme Court. At 
that time, because of the case's relevance to a federal bargaining 
law, management and labor groups withdrew their lobbying ef~ 
forts pending its outcome. The Court, in National League of 
Cities, held the application of the FLSA to the states to be uncon~ 
stitutional, stating: "We hold that insofar as the challenged 
amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to 
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."14 
Following this case, efforts on behalf of federal legislation to 
regulate collective bargaining by state and local government 
employees have proceeded somewhat cautiously. Although even 
proponents of the legislation had taken the position that this case 
terminated chances for passage of a federal bargaining law, 15 new 
appraisals of the case suggest that there may .yet be constitutional 
means available for federal regulation of the labor relations of 
state and local governments. 16 Assuming arguendo that the politi~ 
cal judgment is made to propose federal bargaining legislation, 
the question of its constitutionality arises. This article in Part TI 
will assess federal programs presently regulating the states and, 
in Part ill, will discuss the constitutionality of such programs in 
the context of there being a permissible avenue for a federal 
10. As of October 1976, the full-time equivalent employment of all state and local 
governments was over 10 million persons. [1977] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF-145 
at 71:2116. Almost 30% of these employees are covered by union agreements, and over 2.6 
million belong to unions. 1972 Hearings, note 6 supra, at 71. 
11. See 1972 Hearings, note 6 supra. 
12. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
14. 426 U.S. at 852. 
15. See note 159 and accompanying text infra. 
16. See note 160 and accompanying text infra. 
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collective bargaining statute. Part N will discuss and suggest the 
method for federal control of state and local government labor 
relations most likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
II. FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND REGULATION OF STATES: EXISTING 
A VENUES FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
Although serious questions are raised in National League of 
Cities v. Usery11 as to the extent to which the federal government 
under the commerce clause may regulate the states under a fed-
eral bargaining law, an even more intriguing question remains as 
to whether the federal government would be similarly restrained 
when basing its regulation on its spending power or on the four-
teenth amendment. The Court in National League of Cities ex-
pressly refrained from resolving whether federal regulations it 
ruled unconstitutional would be sanctioned under the spending 
power or the fourteenth amendment stating: "We express no view 
as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to 
affect integral operations of state governments by exercising au-
thority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such 
as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or§ 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. " 18 
In view of the unresolved nature of the issue, a brief descrip-
tion of some of the existing federal programs regulating the states 
is presented, since these programs may provide avenues for fed-
eral regulation of the states' collective bargaining policies or serve 
as models for such federal regulation. 
A. Spending Power: Federal Contracts and Grants 
It is clear that federal grants and procurement contracts have 
significant financial impact on state and local governments. In 
1968, almost 55 billion dollars were expended on federal govern-
ment procurement contracts19 and, in 1975, 52 billion dollars in 
grants were expected to be distributed to state and local govern-
ments {up from 2.2 billion dollars in 1950).20 Although the federal 
government at one time contracted mostly for housekeeping 
17. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
18. ld. at 852 n.17. 
19. See Grossbaum, Procedural Fairness in Public Contracts: The Procurement 
Regulations, 57 VA. L. REv. 171 (1971). 
20. Boasberg & Feldesman, The Washington Beat: Federal Law and Administra-
tion-Recent Developments, 7 URB. LAW. 556 (1975). 
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needs, it has now assumed a major acquisitioning power; its fed-
eral contract and grant interests have expanded beyond the usual 
sphere of goods and services to include research, planning, and 
technological development.21 Coupled with this growth are in-
creasing costs of running state and local governments and declin-
ing state and local revenues. Both these phenomena have pro-
vided the opportunity for federal grant programs such as revenue 
sharing to appear and to receive support from state and local 
government officials. These factors, combined with increasing 
financial support of the state and local programs through the use 
of federal contracts and grants, create the potential for unprece-
dented federal control through the power of the purse. 22 
Guiding state and local use of federal funds is, of course, the 
traditional means for seeking compliance with federal policy 
objectives. In addition to using the money for agreed purposes, 
other conditions or requirements now can include recordkeeping, 
bookkeeping information, eliminating duplicative federal/state 
program management, labor standards and avoiding discrimina-
tory use of the funds. As will be discussed in Part III, the courts 
generally uphold such federally imposed conditions. Legal ques-
tions as to the permissibility of these conditions arise only when 
the federal policy sought to be imposed extends beyond the con-
fines of the particular contract or grant to tangentially related 
matters. 
Though the Court has stated that the tenth amendment does 
not deprive "the national government of authority to resort to all 
means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate 
and plainly adapted to the permitted end,"23 this proposition will 
be reconsidered in light of the National League of Cities case. In 
undertaking this analysis it is necessary first to examine the exist-
ing federal regulation of programs administered by state and local 
governments. 
At times, the distinction between federal procurement con-
tracts and federal grants is blurred, if not elusive, though the 
touchstone of their difference seems to be the nature for which 
they were entered into. A suggested definitional distinction pro-
21. Grossbaum, note 19 supra, at 174. 
22. For example, studies show that while local government expenditures rose 840% 
between 1946 and 1970, the corresponding growth in tax revenues was 692%. See Agnew, 
The Case for Revenue Sharing, 60 GEo. L.J. 7, 31 (1971). 
23. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
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vides: "Contracts in the nature of grants differ from procurement 
contracts in that they are not vehicles for the procurement of 
facilities, goods and services for the needs of administering the 
federal government, but are vehicles for the purpose of providing 
federal assistance to carry out a particular statutory program."24 
Since it might be possible to tie in a federal bargaining guide-
line to either federal contracts or grants, both of which are author-
ized under artiCle I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution, 25 a 
brief consideration of conditions imposed under such programs is 
provided. 
1. Procurement Contracts. - The federal government in 
deciding with whom to contract generally looks for a competent 
supplier who agrees to meet the contractual requirements for the 
lowest price. The federal contractor may be an individual, private 
corporation, or state or local governing body. The power of the 
federal government to set conditions is largely unrestricted. The 
Supreme Court has stated: "Like private individuals and busi-
nesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce 
its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and 
to fix the terms and conditions of its contracts."26 Varied condi-
tions are routinely imposed and uniformly sustained upon judi-
cial review. Limitations do exist, however, when for example the 
federal requirements are excessive, discriminatorily enforced, or 
so vague as to be unenforceableY However, the federal govern-
ment can further nonprocurement objectives by merely attaching 
such conditions to the contracts - these are often called national 
goals clauses, a typical illustration being a nondiscrimination 
clause.28 
Conditions and statutory directives range from national 
goals clauses to labor standards requirements for preferred recipi-
24. Conway, The Federal Grant: An Administrative View, 30 FEn. B.J. 119, 121 
(1971). 
25. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 provides: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises 
shall be uniform throughout the United States." 
26. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940). 
27. See Part Ill infra; see generally O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare 
Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. REv. 443 (1966); Note, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595, 1600 (1960). 
28. Morgan, Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to 
an Unconstrained Administrative Process, 1974 WIS. L. REv. 301. 
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ents of federal contracts.29 Illustrations of federally imposed stan-
dards relating to wages, hours, and working conditions include 
the Walsh-Healey Act,30 which requires government supply con-
tractors to pay their employees a minimum prevailing wage rate 
for the locality as determined by the Secretary of Labor, and the 
Davis-Bacon Act,31 applying the same requirements on federally 
funded construction projects. 
Under federal spending power, pursuant to federal procure-
ment contracts, the government has considerable latitude in 
structuring its contractual relations with state and local govern-
ments; this extends to conditioning a contract award on the state 
or local government's compliance with federal labor policy.32 
However, it is also clear that federal procurement contracts may 
not be best suited for implementing a comprehensive federal 
collective bargaining policy for state and local employment rela-
tions since the receipt of government contracts tends to be spo-
radic and on fragmented subject matters.33 This conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that the federal government prefers the 
grant route rather than the contract procedure in carrying out 
most of its educational, health, social welfare, housing, environ-
mental, and transportation programs.34 
2. Grants. - Federal grants may be divided into two types, 
block and categorical, each having distinct characteristics.35 Cat-
egorical grants are awarded for specific projects approved by the 
29. Illustrations of categories that have been preferred in awarding government con-
tracts include blind industries (41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 (1970)); small enterprises (70A Stat. 
127 (1956); 69 Stat. 580 (1955)); depressed market areas (32 C.F.R. §§ 7.104-.120 (1960)). 
See also Buy America Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-10(d) (1970). 
30. 41 u.s.c. §§ 35-45 (1970). 
31. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276(a) to 276(a)(5) (1970). See also Donahue, The Davis-Bacon Act 
and the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act: A Comparison of Coverage and Minimum 
Wage Provisions, 29 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 488 (1964). · 
32. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276(a)-276(a)(5) (1970). 
33. However, it should be noted that some amount of comprehensiveness could be 
achieved. For example, if a governing body receives any federal contracts, in excess of a 
specified sum, an entire agency of that governmental body is subject to the contractual 
conditions and not just the employees receiving the benefits. An illustration is a university 
which by accepting federal contracts agrees to affirmative action in its personnel policies 
as to all employees on campus. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), as 
amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-70), as amended by Exec. Order 
No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-70), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V 1975). These 
obligations are further implemented by federal regulations. 41 C.F.R. ch. 60 (1976). 
34. See Boas berg & Feldesman, note 20 supra, at 559. 
35. See generally Pinsky & Kurzman, Preface to National Institute on Federal Urban 
Grants: Policies and Procedures, 22 An. L. REv. 113 (1970). 
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federal government whereas block grants are used to disburse 
substantial amounts of money to state and local governments.36 
Fewer restrictions are attached to block grants to permit the state 
and local governments flexibility in implementing federal goals. 
Under block grants the aggregate available federal money is ap-
portioned on a formula basis among the states and their political 
subdivisions once the appropriate plans and filing requirements 
have been submitted to the administering federal agency.37 
(a) Categorical grants. - Federal funds provided to states 
and localities under categorical grants are for specified projects, 
and the federal government typically maintains strict controls to 
ensure not only that the funds are used efficiently, but also that 
the beneficiaries of the program are protected. 38 Conditions and 
restrictions imposed on the use of the funds include statutory 
provisions both specific to the project and generally applicable to 
federal funding contracts and projects, as well as statutes involv-
ing constitutional standards applicable to those imbued with suf-
ficient state action. Examples are antidiscrimination provisions, 39 
the Hatch Act, 40 which conditions federal monies to states and 
localities on their agreement that certain public officials refrain 
from political activity, and the Highway Beautification Act of 
1965,41 which requires the states to institute programs for effective 
control and maintenance of outdoor advertising. Obviously such 
federal regulation can substantially influence state and local gov-
ernment conduct of business, and enforcement machinery stands 
ready to find violations and order compliance. For example, a 
state in violation of the Hatch Act provision could be ordered to 
discharge the guilty employee upon threat of reduced federal 
funding in an amount twice the amount of the offender's annual 
salary.42 In the case of the Highway Beautification Act, a noncom-
plying state could lose ten percent of its federal highway funds. 43 
36. Id. 
37. Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid 
Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv. 600 (1972). 
38. Willcox, The Function & Nature of Grants in National Institute on Federal Urban 
Grants: Policies and Procedures, 22 Ao. L. REV. 131 (1970). 
39. 23 U.S.C. § 140(a) (1970). 
40. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Palmer 
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1962). 
41. 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1970), enforced, Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. 
Vt. 1974). 
42. Ohio v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ohio 1946). 
43. 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1970), enforced, Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. 
Vt. 1974). 
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Clearly, the federal government has great latitude in regulating 
the state and local governments' abilities to receive and adminis-
ter federally funded projects and in subjecting them to far-
reaching conditions including labor standards. 
(b) Block grants. -As mentioned above, vast amounts of 
federal funds are expended under the block grant program. In 
1975, the program funded over 500 domestic projects and involved 
an expenditure of 52 billion dollars, most of which was spent 
under the revenue sharing program.44 In its first year of operation, 
1972, revenue sharing accounted for over thirty-six percent of the 
total funding for federal grants. Over a five-year period, the pro-
gram disbursed 30.2 billion dollars to 38,000 governing bodies.45 
Even though block grants have the least restrictive federal 
controls, conditions imposed on state and local government recip-
ients of the funds do exist. For example, in the past under the 
revenue sharing law, conditions have included: (1) limitation of 
spending to statutorily prescribed priority expenditures46 and (2) 
prohibition on using the funds to acquire matching federal 
fundsY Current conditions include prohibition on discriminating 
on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex in any program 
funded in whole or in part by the federal funds. 48 A more signifi-
cant condition, however, is found in the miscellaneous conditions 
where, in addition to accounting and reporting requirements, 
44. Two-thirds of the designated monies is to go to the local governments, and the 
remaining one-third is to be distributed to the state governments. State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1264 (Supp. V 1975). See Sklar, Impact of 
Revenue Sharing on Minorities and the Poor, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 93, 94 (1975). 
45. See Sklar, note 44 supra, at 98. 
46. These included (1) ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating expenses 
for (A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection, and building code en-
forcement), (B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sanitation, and pol-
lution abatement), (C) public transportation (including transit systems and streets and 
roads), (D) health, (E) recreation, (F) libraries, (G) social services for the poor or aged, 
and (H) financial administration; and (2) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures 
authorized by law. 31 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(1-2) (Supp. V 1975). This section was repealed 
by Act Oct. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-488, § 3 (a), 90 Stat. 2341. 
47. 31 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (Supp. V 1975). This section was repealed by Act Oct. 13, 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-488, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 2341. 
48. I d. § 1242(a) (Supp. V 1975) as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-488, § 8, 90 Stat. 2350. 
Failure to comply with this provision may be referred to the Attorney General, who may 
bring an action pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for appropriate orders 
including injunctive relief. 31 U.S.C. § 1242(g) as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-488, § Sa, 
90 Stat. 2350. Courts have afforded relief under § 1242. Cf. United States v. City of 
Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (an action by individual plaintiffs for injunctive 
and declaratory relieO. 
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wage requirements for public employees are mandated. 49 Labor-
ers and mechanics employed on projects funded twenty-five per-
cent or more with federal monies must be paid prevailing wages 
in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act.50 Additionally, public 
employees working in programs or activities in whole or in part 
funded by revenue sharing funds must be paid wages nQt less 
than those paid to persons in similar public positions with the 
same employer if twenty-five percent of all such employees in the 
state or local government are paid from the revenue sharing 
funds.51 Obviously, the ability of the federal government to regu-
late state and local government personnel matters through the 
use of block grants is becoming less problematical and more evi-
dent in practice. 
In addition to labor relations matters, other state and local 
government interests and responsibilities, such as law enforce-
ment programs, are becoming enmeshed with federal funding and 
regulation. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
196852· created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
[hereinafter referred to as LEAA] as a means of encouraging 
state and local development of comprehensive law enforcement 
programs. The first year's appropriation in 1969 of 63 million 
dollars increased to 850 million dollars for fiscal year 1973;53 
again, this illustrates that federal involvement, if not also regula-
tion, is on the increase in programs involving the vital interests 
of state and local governments. The courts' traditional predispo-
sition in balancing these federal/state interests in the area of 
block grants has been to uphold the right of federal regulation 
through the use of the federal purse;54 with respect to regulating 
49. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1243(a)(1)-(8) (Supp. V 1975) as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-488, 
§§ 3(b), 9, 12, 90 Stat. 2341, 2354, 2357. 
50. Id. § 1243(a)(6). 
51. I d. § 1243(a)(7). Failure to comply with these miscellaneous provisions, after the 
exhaustion of 60 days notice for corrective action, will result in suspension of funds for 
the remainder of the entitlement period and future entitlement periods, until the Secre-
tary is satisfied that full and proper corrective action has occurred. Id. § 1243(b) (Supp. 
V 1975). In United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977), $76 million in 
federal monies was withheld because of noncompliance with revenue sharing conditions. 
52. 84 Stat. 1880 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, & 42 U.S.C. (1970)). See 
generally Rector & Wolfle, The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 
Perspective, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RtpHTS L. REv. 55 (1973). 
53. Rector & Wolfle, note 52 supra, at 65 n.46. 
54. In upholding the right of the federal government to withhold federal funds from 
state and local governments violating the Hatch Act, the Supreme Court said that al-
though "[t]he United States is not concerned with and has no power to regulate political 
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LEAA money, one court has held recently that the federal govern-
ment can insert conditions on block grants which are not even 
statutorily enumerated in the enabling legislation.55 Whether 
there is continuing vitality to the ostensibly limitless ability of 
the federal government to regulate indirectly the state and local 
governments through such means, in view of the thrust of 
National League of Cities, will be discussed in Part ill below. 
(c) Federal minimum bargaining standards in public urban 
transit systems. - Publicly owned urban transit systems' labor 
relations policies have been indirectly regulated by the federal 
government since 1964 through the Urban Mass Transportation 
Act of 196458 [hereinafter referred to as UMTA], which provides 
federal aid to public systems formerly privately owned and oper-
ated. Most urban mass transit systems were privately owned in 
the 1960's but by the mid-1970's, so many had become publicly 
owned that eighty-four percent of the employees worked for such 
public employers.57 In an attempt to protect the collective bar-
gaining rights that the employees had in the private sector under 
the NLRA, 58 union groups successfully had included in the federal 
funding law a mandatory provision that workers and their unions 
would lose no bargaining rights resulting from public takeovers 
financed by federal funds. Section 13(c) of the UMTA, setting the 
requirements for receipt of federal funds, provides: 
It shall be a condition of any assistance . . . that fair and 
equitable arrangements are made, as determined by the Secre-
tary of Labor, to protect the interests of employees affected by 
such assistance. Such protective arrangements shall include, 
without being limited to, such provisions as may be necessary 
for . . . (2) the continuation of collective bargaining rights 
Sl 
. . . . 
activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its 
money allotments to states shall be disbursed." Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). 
55. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). 
56. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See generally Barnum, National 
Public Labor Relations Legislation: The Case of Urban Mass Transit, 27 LAB. L.J. 168 
(1976). 
57. AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANsiT Ass'N, 1974·75 TRANsiT FACT BooK II (1975). Addition-
ally, these employers carried 90% of the revenue passengers.Id. 
58. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970). It has been estimated 
that 95% of all transit properties were unionized under the NLRA. Barnum, note 56 supra, 
at 170. 
59. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1970). 
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Thus it can be seen that, though the law does not specify 
precise requirements to which the public employer must adhere, 
it does require bestowal of bargaining rights even in states with-
out bargaining statutes and federal approval of any such proce-
dures agreed to by the parties.60 In the absence of statutory au-
thorization to bargain or to strike, the resulting unavailability of 
the federal funding arrangement has prompted some states to 
pass permissive bargaining legislation,61 though strike prohibi-
tions are usually retained and supplemented with binding arbi-
tration provisions resolving any and all labor disputes.62 The fed-
eral funding arrangement under the UMTA thus provides a work-
ing model for federal regulation of the labor relations of public 
employees through the imposition offederal minimum bargaining 
standards tied to federal funding. 
(d) Federal/state cooperative programs: unemployment 
compensation model. - The constitutional provision which au-
thorizes the spending power discussed above as well as the taxing 
power63 has also been the basis for federal regulations concerning 
state unemployment problems, an area certainly of vital interest 
to state governments. Pursuant to this power, Congress estab-
lished a federal/state program of unemployment insurance under 
the Social Security Act, 64 presently covering over eighty-five per-
cent of wage and salary workers. 55 Designed to provide temporary 
wage loss compensation to employees as protection against the 
60. Between 1964 and 1975, the Secretary of Labor considered more than 800 cases 
and denied only three grant applications because of the parties' failure to meet the mini-
mum standards. Barnum, note 56 supra, at 171. 
61. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 15.1-1357.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977). 
62. Virginia's statute reads, "The employees of any transit facility . . . shall have 
the right, in the case of any labor dispute relating to the terms and conditions of their 
employment for the purpose of resolving such dispute, to submit the dispute to final and 
binding arbitration by an impartial umpire or board of arbitrators acceptable to the 
parties." VA. CODE § 15.1-1357.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977). For a discussion of the legality of 
such statutes, see Note, Binding Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector: Is It 
Constitutional?, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 787 (1977). The issue of whether a public em-
ployer can be compelled by an arbitrator to fund its contractual arrangements is discussed 
in Mulcahy, The Ability to Pay: The Public Employee Dilemma, 31 ARB. J. 90 (1976). 
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
64. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 
(1970 & Supp. V 1975), and Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1970 & Supp. V 
1975). See also Staff Data and Materials on Unemployment Compensation Amendments 
of 1976 (H.R. 10210), Committee on Finance, United States Senate (Wash. 1976) 
[hereinafter referred to as Staff Data H.R. 10210]. 
65. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1976, Table 465 p. 297. 
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economic hazards of unemployment, the insurance program es-
tablishes a fund from payroll taxes from which to pay benefits. 66 
The federal provisions in the Social Security Act and the 
Federal Employment Tax Act67 establish the basic framework of 
the system, and certain minimum federal requirements must be 
met by the states before the employers can qualify for the bene-
fits. 68 If a state passes a law which meets these requirements, 
employers subject to the 3.2 percent federal payroll tax receive a 
2.7 percent credit against such tax.69 Further, the state is entitled 
to federal grants to cover all of the necessary costs of administer-
ing the program. 70 Until 1976, exceptions existed for state and 
local government employment; however, amendments have been 
added recently to include these employees beginning January 1, 
1978, notwithstanding the potential constitutional question re-
garding the federal government's authority to regulate state labor 
relations after National League of Cities. 71 On that issue, the 
Solicitor of Labor takes the position that it is within the power 
of Congress to impose such federal requirements subject to cer-
tain conditions, one such condition being that state unemploy-
ment compensation laws cover state and local government em-
ployees.72 Though this type of federal regulation involving fed-
eral/state cooperation with conditioned grants has been upheld 
by the courts, 73 it remains to be seen whether article I, section 8, 
clause 1 of the Constitution continues to provide the authority for 
Congress to regulate state and local employment relations under 
66. See, e.g., Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op Growers, 166 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1948). 
67. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
68. Though there are many requirements, one which pertains to labor relations mat-
ters states that compensation cannot be denied to anyone who refuses to accept work 
because the job is vacant as the direct result of a labor dispute, or because the wages, 
hours, or conditions of work are substandard, or if as a condition of employment, the 
individual would have to join a company union or resign from or refrain from joining a 
labor union. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) (1970). 
69. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3302(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
71. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 115, 
90 Stat. 2667 (1976), codified in scattered sections of 5, 26, and 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 
1977). 
72. "It is also within the power of Congress to grant funds to the States to assist them 
in the administration and funding . . . , to place limitations on those grants and to make 
it a condition of such grants [to be approved by federal authorities]." Staff Data H.R. 
10210, note 65 supra, at Appendix A, 97. 
73. See notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra. 
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such an arrangement, a question specifically reserved in National 
League of Cities v. Usery14 and one which will be discussed below. 
B. Fourteenth Amendment 
In 1964, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
title TI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulating public accommo-
dations.75 The legislative history showed that the fundamental 
objective of title n was "to vindicate the deprivation of personal 
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments" and was based on the authority of section 5 of 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as well 
as Congress' power "to regulate interstate commerce under Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution."76 In deciding the case, the Court 
noted that ample power for the legislation existed under the com-
merce clause and, therefore, it need not consider the other 
ground.77 The Court added: "That is not to say that the remaining 
authority upon which it acted was not adequate, a question upon 
which we do not pass, but merely that since the commerce power 
is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone."78 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the 
fourteenth amendment would be the more appropriate way of 
dealing with the problem of racial discrimination and thereby 
would provide broad federal power eliminating the need for the 
interstate commerce nexus.79 Justice Goldberg, in a concurring 
opinion, added that "Congress clearly had authority under both 
§ 5 of the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause to 
enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964."80 However constitutionally 
permissible, there have been voices raised questioning the pro-
priety of a decision based on the fourteenth amendment. For 
example, one observer noted: "(A] decision based on the four-
teenth amendment would have tremendous momentum of princi-
ple with potential disruptive consequences for state-federal rela-
tionships and implications for judicial power and duty fortran-
scending the immediate controversy-in fact, far beyond issues 
74. 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17 (1976). 
75. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
76. Id. at 249-50. 
77. ld. at 250. 
78. Id. 
79. ld. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
80. ld. at 293 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See generally Note, The Civil Rights Act of 
1964-Source and Scope of Congressional Power, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 574 (1965). 
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of racial discrimination or public accommodation."81 
Both the public and the private sectors have been subject to 
legislative command under the fourteenth amendment, and fed-
eral regulation of state and local governments' personnel policies 
continues to grow. For example, in 1972 Congress extended cover-
age of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act82 to state and 
local government employers and set forth minimal standards 
under which a public employer must deal with its employees.83 
The Supreme Court upheld this extension in Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer. 8~ The added coverage was based on congressional author-
ity under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.85 The Court 
explained this authority as being a very broad power: "When 
Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative 
authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional 
grant, it is exercising authority under one section of a constitu-
tional amendment whose other sections by their own terms em-
body limitations on state authority."86 
Since Fitzpatrick, other federal laws regulating state labor 
policies have been upheld, based at least partially on the four-
teenth amendment, including the Equal Pay Act of 196387 and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196788 as will be dis-
cussed below. Thus, if a case can be made that federal collective 
bargaining legislation is necessary to secure equal protection 
under the fourteenth amendment, then the developing law sug-
gests section five of the fourteenth amendment might provide a 
vehicle for federal intervention.89 
81. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 130 (1965). 
82. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5314-5316, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975). 
83. [d. 
84. 427 u.s. 45 (1976). 
85. ld. at 453 n.9. 
86. ld. at 456. The Court added by footnote that "[a]part from their claim that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars enforcel'\ent of the remedy established by Title VII in this 
case, respondent state officials do not contend that the substantive provisions of Title VII 
as applied here are not a proper exercise of congressional authority under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." ld. at n.11. 
87. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970). 
88. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-634 (197o & supp. v 1975). 
89. The road to finding violations of equal protection may be difficult, as illustrated 
in ,Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, where he stated that even in Fitzpatrick he did 
not believe a violation had been shown. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458 (Stevens, 
,J., concurring). 
This issue and the issue of whether the National League of Cities case makes inroads 
on Fitzpatrick will be discussed under section III. 
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C. Commerce Clause 
The most obvious possible legal basis for federal regulation 
of labor relations matters is found in the commerce clause of the 
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to legislate over activi-
ties in interstate commerce or, by judicial interpretation, those 
activities affecting interstate commerce. 90 To meet the traditional 
constitutional standards, a federal collective bargaining law 
would need first to have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce 
to be a proper subject of federal legislation and, second, to have 
a rational basis for its regulatory scheme.91 
The effect on interstate commerce of the activities of state 
and local governments is substantial and easy to observe. For 
example, in 1970 the interstate purchases made for these govern-
ments amounted to an estimated 121 billion dollars, or ninety-
two percent of total state and local government expenditures. 
This figure represented 12.4 percent of the gross national product 
and involved over three million private employees.92 In 1971, pur-
chases amounted to 135 billion dollars of which fifty-seven per-
cent was for compensating nearly 9.7 million employees. Employ-
ment generated by state and local government purchase of goods 
and supplies for these activities accounted for an additional 3. 7 
million jobs, making a total of nearly 13.4 million jobs, a figure 
which is more than sixteen percent of the nation's total civilian 
employment.93 Likewise, public employee strikes have repeatedly 
occurred; in 1973, 386 work stoppages by state and local govern-
ment employees resulted in a loss of2,299,300 man-days ofwork, 9~ 
not an inconsequential effect on interstate commerce. 
90. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: (Congress shall have Power) "To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes." See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
91. For a general discussion of this subject matter prior to National League of Cities, 
see Brown, Constitutional Basis and Implications of Federal Collective Bargaining Legis-
lation for State and Local Employees, 1 OKLA. CITY L. REv. 125, 133 (1976). 
92. Hearing on H.R. 12532, H.R. 7684, and H.R. 9324 Before the Special Subcomm. 
on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1972) (statement of Jerry WurO. 
93. 119 CONG. REc. S.24817-820 14,057 (daily ed. July 19, 1973). For a summary of 
the effect on commerce of spending and employment by state and local government, see 
S. REP. No. 690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 24 (1974). 
94. BuREAU oF LABoR STATISTics, U.S. DEP'T oF LABOR, REPORT No. 434, WoRK STOP· 
PAGES IN GovERNMENT 3 (1973). For discussion of the consequences of strikes on strikers 
and the community, see Thiebolt & Corwin, Welfare and Strikes, The Use of Public Funds 
To Support Strikers, LABOR RELATIONS AND PUBLIC PoLICY SERIES, Report No. 6 (Wharton 
School of Fin. & Comm. (1972)). 
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With fewer than forty states having bargaining laws, many 
of which cover only relatively few categories of employees,9" it is 
perhaps pertinent to note that the NLRA has as one of its justifi-
cations: "The denial by some employers of the right to organize 
and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of 
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial 
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of 
burdening or obstructing commerce .... "96 
The second constitutional requisite under the commerce 
clause for a federal bargaining law-having a rational basis for 
the regulatory scheme-also appears present. Just as the basic 
purpose of the NLRA is to minimize industrial strife and provide 
for equality of bargaining power between employees and em-
ployer, 97 so also in the public sector are the same goals relevant 
and necessary in view of the often piecemeal, noncomprehensive 
approach to governmental labor relations employed by most state 
and local governments. 98 It has been axiomatic that when the 
states fail to meet a perceived public need, the federal govern-
ment may move in to fill that need. Such a default by the states 
has, in other areas of social and economic legislation, provided a 
rational basis for and has led to federal regulation of unemploy-
ment insurance, occupational safety and health, civil rights, and 
private sector labor relations. 99 It is predictable that a rational 
basis would be present for federal bargaining legislation covering 
state and local employees. 
The national authority for such legislation under the com-
merce clause would not have been doubted until recently. Chief 
Justice Marshall in 1824 described the clause as providing the 
95. See McCann & Smiley, note 5 supra, at 495-514; Brown, note 4 supra, at 695-
711. 
96. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970). 
97. [d. In upholding the constitutional rationality of the NLRA, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
[S]toppage of those operations by industrial strife would have a most serious 
effect upon interstate commerce .... Experience has abundantly demon-
strated that the recognition of the right of employees to self-organization and 
to have representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. 
NLRB v. ,Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1937). 
98. See Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective and Legislative 
Opportunitie.~. 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1973). 
99. An illustration of federal intervention due to state inaction in unemployment 
compensation is found in Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insur-
ance in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REV. 181, 185 (1955). 
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plenary power to regulate and held that "[t]his power, like all 
others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised 
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, orher 
[sic] than are prescribed in the Constitution."100 Supreme Court 
opinions since that time have steadfastly fulfilled that definition 
and have consistently held that federal regulation of labor rela-
tions matters is a proper congressional power under the commerce 
clause. 101 
The extension and application of the above rationale to the 
public sector was clearly accomplished in 1968 in Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 102 when the Supreme Court upheld extension of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act103 to cover public employees of state owned 
hospitals and schools. The Court stated: "If a State is engaging 
in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal 
Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too 
may be forced tO COnform its activities tO federal regulation." 10~ 
This decision apparently laid to rest arguments that there were 
any limitations on Congress' power to regulate the labor relations 
of state and local governments. Arguments that the very essence 
of federalism, i.e., that the balance of power between federal and 
state governments permitting continued diversity and experi-
mentation by the states was being destroyed by giving the federal 
government a predominant role, were again stilled by the Court 
as had been the judicial practice for years10s in setting aside 
claims of interference with state sovereignty.106 However, oppo-
nents of federal intervention persisted and continued to maintain 
that the tenth amendment to the Constitution prohibited federal 
regulation and thereby reserved such decisions to the states or the 
people, 107 even though the law had developed to the point where 
100. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 86, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). 
101. See generally P.R. BENSON, JR., THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE CoMMERCE CLAUSE, 
1937-1970 (1970). 
102. 392 u.s. 183 (1968). 
103. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219 (1970). 
104. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968). 
105. This was usually done on the basis stated long ago by Justice Johnson in Gib-
bons v. Ogden: "If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the 
constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the states free from all 
invidious and partial restraints." 22 U.S. 1, 101, 9 Wheat. 1, 230 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
106. E.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
107. U.S. CaNST. amend. X. The concept of dual federalism wherein state powers 
limit the national power though displaced by traditional judicial construction has been 
summarized as follows: 
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the tenth amendment had been characterized as a "truism," 
merely stating that "all is retained which had not been surren-
dered." 108 
However, in 1975 the Supreme Court in Fry v. United 
States, 109 while upholding federal regulation of state employees' 
wages, made inroads in that precedent by cautioning that the 
tenth amendment "expressly declares the. constitutional policy 
that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs 
the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a 
federal system."uo The ultimate rehabilitation of the tenth 
amendment vis a vis state and local governments came in 1976 
in a case testing the constitutionality of extending federal fair 
labor standards to those governments. In National League of Ci-
ties v. Usery, 111 a five-four decision, the Supreme Court overruled 
150 years of legal precedent and attempted to realign the fed-
eral/state relationship by placing a limit on the federal govern-
ment's ability to regulate states through a restriction on the com-
merce power based on the tenth amendment: "We hold that inso-
far as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the 
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions, they are not within the authority 
granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."n2 Whether this holding 
forecloses use of the commerce power as a basis for federal bar-
gaining legislation will be discussed below. 
Another argument for possible limitation of federal regula-
tion under the commerce power has been the eleventh amend-
(I) The national government is one of enumerated powers only; (2) Also, the 
purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; (3) Within their respec-
tive spheres the two centers of government are "sovereign", and hence "equal"; 
( 4) The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension rather than 
collaboration. 
Corwin, The Pa.~sing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1950). 
108. United States v. Darby, 31~ U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
109. 421 u.s. 542 (1975). 
110. !d. at 547 n.7. 
111. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). For general discussion, see Note, State Governmental Im-
munity From Federal Regulation Based on the Commerce Clause -National League of 
Cities v. Usery, 26 DE PAULL. REv. 101 (1976). 
112. 426 U.S. at 852. For discussion of general implications of this case on federalism, 
see Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? 
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental 
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New 
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REv. 
1065 (1977). 
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ment of the Constitution, 113 which provides nonconsenting states 
immunity from suit by private citizens in federal court. Ob-
viously, such a limitation would hamper enforcement of collective 
bargaining rights under federal regulation by limiting forums for 
enforcement. However, the Supreme Court has recently upheld 
the constituti<mal power of Congress under the commerce dause 
to legislate in the area of labor standards as applied to public 
employers, notwithstanding the eleventh amendment. 114 The 
Court ruled that in view of the plenary power of Congress over 
commerce, congressional intent to lift the immunity provided by 
the eleventh amendment, although not to be implied, may be 
accomplished by express provisions, presumably within the new 
limits prescribed by the National League of Cities case. 115 The 
relevancy of the eleventh amendment problem as it relates to 
available remedies under a federal bargaining law may be mini-
mal as most states have consented in employment contracts to 
sue and be sued, and most contract claims are brought in state 
court. 116 
An interesting, yet distinct, parallel development involving 
judicial interpretation of the eleventh amendment as it affects 
federal regulation of the states arose in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 117 
There the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Civil Rights Act as 
applied to state governments, rejecting the argument that the 
113. "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. For discussion, see C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY (1972); Comment, The Elusive Eleventh Amendment and the Perimeters of 
Federal Power, 46 U. CoLO. L. REV. 211 (1974). 
114. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. 
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). 
115. Justice Brennan added, in dissent, that Congress can "readily repair the defi-
ciency . . . simply by amending the Act expressly to declare that a State that engages in 
an enterprise covered by the 1966 amendments shall be amenable to suit . . . in federal 
court." Id. at 308-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). That proposition of course now must be 
reviewed within the context of National League of Cities. 
116. However, drafting of federal legislation would need to provide proper forums for 
suit and remedies, especially in view of potential federal preemption problems. For an 
overview of possible implications, see Chanin & Snyder, The Bugaboo of Federal Preemp-
tion: An Analysis of the Relationship Between a Federal Collective Bargaining Statute for 
Employees of State and Local Governments and State Statutes Affecting Such 
Employees, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 236 (1975); Lieberman, Memorandum Analysis of 
Preemption Problems With Proposed Federal Bargaining Legislation for State/Local 
Employees, [1975) Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. (BNA) 593: E-1 at E-2; Brown, note 91 supra, 
at 148-51. 
117. 427 u.s. 445 (1976). 
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eleventh amendment and the principle of state sovereignty 
barred suits by citizens against their state employers. 118 However, 
this federal legislation was based on section 5 of the fourteenth 
amendment, which the Court found a necessary limitation on the 
"Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty it 
embodies." 119 The Court added that this federal authority is plen-
ary and appropriate under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 
and "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legisla-
tion' . . . provide for private suits against States or state officials 
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."120 
Thus, it can be seen that federal regulation of state and local 
government labor relations may be possible under different con-
stitutional avenues. The ultimate legality of course depends on 
the Supreme Court's future interpretation of these various bases 
when placed in the context of the appropriate federal/state rela-
tionship as delineated in National League of Cities. That task is 
undertaken below. It should be noted at the outset that there is 
ample room for multiple interpretations, encouraged by the five-
four decision in National League of Cities, with the fifth vote a 
concurring opinion based on an approach balancing the state and 
federal interests. 
ill. LEGALITY OF FEDERAL BARGAINING LEGISLATION: ANALYSIS OF 
POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES 
Whether federal bargaining legislation for state and local 
employees will withstand constitutional scrutiny may well de-
pend upon the legal basis advanced by its drafters. Recent history 
demonstrates federal powers have greatly expanded, often at the 
expense of the states' powers, and it is altogether possible that 
such an expansion will continue notwithstanding the National 
League of Cities rationale or, alternatively, that other constitu-
tionally sound bases for the exercise of congressional authority 
will be found to support bargaining legislation. For example, as 
discussed in this article, recent legal interpretations make it ap-
pear possible to use the tax power for purposes having no relation 
to the raising of revenues, or to use federal funds to purchase 
compliance with regulations that could not be enacted as regula-
118. ld. 
119. ld. at 456. 
120. ld. 
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tory laws, or to enact federal laws under the fourteenth amend-
ment, which in other contexts might be unconstitutional. 
These observations merely restate the legal analytical frame-
work established by recent Supreme Court holdings. In National 
League of Cities, the expansion of federal power to regulate the 
states under the commerce clause was slowed, if not halted, by 
emanations from the tenth amendment wherein federal regula-
tion operated "to directly displace the States' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional government func-
tions."121 However, the Court specifically reserved judgment as to 
whether such regulation might be permissible under the spending 
power or the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. 122 In 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 123 decided during the same term as National 
League of Cities, the Court upheld the federal regulation of the 
states under the fourteenth amendment, stating that such power 
is "plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant" and 
which by its terms embodies "limitations on state authority." 12~ 
Which, if any, constitutional bases would provide a permissible 
means for federal regulation of state and local labor relations, in 
light of these cases, is explored below. 
A. Commerce Clause Power After National League of Cities 
For over 150 years there had been a general expansion of 
federal power under the commerce clause of the Constitution. In 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 125 the Supreme Court upheld that expansion 
to the public sector by permitting extension of the FLSAI26 to 
employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools. The Court 
stated: "If a State is engaging in economic activities that are 
validly regulated by the Federal government when engaged in by 
private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activi-
ties to federal regulation."127 
However, in 1976 the Supreme Court in National League of 
Cities128 expressly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz and jolted the 
heretofore easy expansion of federal power to an apparent stand-
121. 426 u.s. 833, 852 (1976). 
122. Id. at n.17. 
123. 427 u.s. 445 (1976). 
124. ld. at 456. 
125. 392 u.s. 183 (1968). 
126. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219 (1970). 
127. 392 U.S. at 197. 
128. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
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still by holding that the federal authority under the commerce 
clause is limited by the "undoubted attribute of state sover-
eignty" secured by the tenth amendment. 129 The case involved a 
challenge to Congress' 1974 amendments to the FLSA, which 
extended coverage offederal minimum wage and overtime regula-
tions to state and local government employees. 130 States and lo-
calities, chafing under burgeoning personnel costs, intricate re-
porting requirements, and curtailed public services, argued that 
this intrusion into internal state and local affairs exceeded con-
gressional authority. 131 The Supreme Court agreed, ruling the 
amendments invalid inasmuch as they impaired the states' integ-
rity or "ability to function effectively in a federal system."132 The 
Court emphasized that "there are attributes of sovereignty at-
taching to every state government which may not be impaired by 
Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of 
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Consti-
tution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that man-
ner. "133 
The majority opinion based its holding on a two-pronged 
test, determining that federal regulations are outside the scope of 
the commerce clause if their coverage extends to "'functions 
essential to separate and independent existence' ... so that 
Congress may not abrogate the States' otherwise plenary author-
ity to make them"134 and operates "to directly displace the States' 
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional 
governmental functions . . . . " 135 In seeking to define the states' 
"essential functions," the Court identified typical illustrations as 
including "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public 
health, and parks and recreation,"136 and held that the FLSA 
129. !d. at 845. 
130. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(s)(5), (x) (Supp. V 1975). 
131. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
132. !d. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). The Court 
split five to four in National League of Cities, or, more correctly, four-one-four with Justice 
Blackmun concurring. 
133. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976). 
134. !d. (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). 
135. 426 U.S. at 852. 
136. !d. at 851. The Court notes that "(t]hese examples are obviously not an exhaus-
tive catalogue of the numerous line and support activities which are well within the area 
of traditional operations of state and local governments." !d. at 851 n.16. The Court 
contrasted those examples with state activities not regarded as "integral parts of their 
governmental activities" such as when a state operates a railroad (citing United States v. 
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936))./d. at 854 n.18. 
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amendments would significantly alter or displace the states' abil-
ities to structure employer-employee relationships in these 
areas. 137 The Court cited instances in the record in which higher 
wages required by the Act forced curtailment of, inter alia, police 
cadet training, affirmative action programs, work-study police 
programs, and internship classes as well as supplanting state pol-
icy choices in establishing employee wage scales and work sched-
ules.138 These factors, in the Court's judgment, touched an 
"undoubted attribute of state sovereignty . . . to determine the 
wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order 
to carry out their governmental functions" 139 and displaced the 
states' freedom to structure these integral operations. Inasmuch 
as the only discretion left to the states under the federal regula-
tion was to raise taxes or cut services or payrolls to meet their 
mandated increased costs, these factors were unconstitutional. uo 
Though this decision is the first to articulate explicitly any 
state sovereign limitation on the commerce power, it was foresha-
dowed by the Court's 1975 decision in Fry v. United States. 141 In 
that case, the Federal Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, u2 
which imposed a temporary wage freeze for state and local gov-
ernment employees, was upheld under the commerce power, but 
the Court cautioned that Congress cannot "exercise [its] power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to 
function effectively in a federal system."143 In upholding the stat-
ute, the Fry Court had essentially set aside the states' contracts 
with their labor unions and employees. The majority in National 
League of Cities evidently felt, however, that the statute in Fry 
was less intrusive on state choices as to how governmental opera-
137. 426 U.S. at 852. 
138. Id. at 846. 
139. ld. at 845. 
140. Regulations on compensatory time off forced localities to restructure work sched-
ules in a way the Court found to be "highly disruptive" and costly, imposing substantially 
higher personnel costs (estimated in California to be between $8 million and $16 million). 
Id. at 846. · 
141. 421 u.s. 542 (1975). 
142. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. V 1975). 
143. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7. Justice Brennan, in dissent, takes 
issue with the majority's reliance on the quote from Fry: 
The only import of the footnote in Fry, then, is that Congress may not invade 
state sovereignty by exercising powers not delegated to it by the Constitution; 
since the wage ceilings at issue in Fry were clearly within the commerce power, 
we found no "drastic invasion of state sovereignty." 
426 U.S. at 861-62 n.4. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
368 SoUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEw [Vol. 29 
tions should be structured than the FLSA, which affected what 
wages would be paid, what hours would be worked, and what 
compensation would be provided for overtime.144 Both enact-
ments operated to coerce states into establishing wage scales at 
federal direction, with one requiring a minimum wage and the 
other prohibiting wage increases in excess of seven percent. 145 Yet 
the majority in National League of Cities preserved the Fry ra-
tionale, noting that in Fry there was an 
extremely serious problem which endangered the well-being of 
all the component parts of our federal system and which only 
collective action by the National Government might forestall. 
The means selected were carefully drafted so as not to interfere 
with the States' freedom beyond a very limited, specific period 
of time . . . . The limits imposed upon the commerce power 
when Congress seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflexi-
ble as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a 
national emergency .146 
An additional factor distinguishing Fry is that in the 
National League of Cities case there was no forced choice between 
additional financial burdens or alteration of state choices on 
structuring its operations. The financial impact of federal com-
merce legislation on state operations has long been considered a 
policy question, appropriately left for resolution by Congress op-
erating within the political arena. 147 However, the Court in 
National League of Cities took special note of the "significant 
impact on the functioning of the governmental bodies involved"148 
by the potential increased costs of complying with the FLSA as 
that contributed to displacing a state's choices. 
A most vigorous attack on the majority was written by Jus-
144. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
145. In dissent, Justice Brennan noted that fact and stated, "[l]t is absurd to sug-
gest that there is a constitutionally significant distinction between curbs against increas-
ing wages and curbs against paying wages lower than the federal minimum." Id. at 872 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
146. ld. at 853. 
147. The Court has stated that cost considerations relate not to constitutional issues, 
.but rather to the "wisdom, need, and effectiveness of a particular project," and are 
therefore questions for Congress. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 527 
(1941). Cf. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. 
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (where the Court held that the increased costs 
of FLSA amendments do not affect the validity of the commerce power even though "it 
may place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the states." !d. at 284.). 
148. 426 U.S. at 846. 
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tice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, who found 
no precedent for a tenth amendment limitation on the commerce 
power or other delegated powers. 149 Justice Brennan characterized 
the repudiation by the majority of 150 years of unbroken preced-
ent in favor of a novel sovereignty doctrine as an ill-conceived 
abstraction with "profoundly pernicious consequences, " 1"0 which 
"can only be regarded as a transparent cover for invalidating a 
congressional judgment with which they disagree."151 Justice 
Brennan maintained that the majority result rendered a 
"catastrophic judicial body blow at Congress' power under the 
Commerce Clause . . . [with] an ominous portent of disruption 
of our constitutional structure implicit in today's mischievous 
decision.'' 152 
The deciding vote in the case was cast by Justice Blackmun 
in a concurring opinion, which was much less pervasive than that 
of the majority. 153 Justice Blackmun expressed concern with the 
majority's broad holding that Congress can never constitutionally 
regulate the activities of the states in the area of their essential 
functions. 154 Since Justice Blackmun will presumably have the 
deciding vote in future cases, it is important to examine how he 
perceives the limits on congressional power to regulate the states 
under the commerce power. Justice Blackmun admitted to being 
"not untroubled by certain possible implications of the Court's 
opinion," which he identified as a "balancing approach" and 
adopted as his own. 155 This approach in future cases, Justice 
Blackmun said, would "not outlaw federal power ... where the 
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility 
compliance with imposed federal standards would be essen-
tial. "156 
149. Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
150. /d. at 861-63. 
151. Id. at 860. 
152. /d. at 880. The other dissent was by Justice Stevens, who intimated the majority 
had merely substituted its policy judgment for that of Congress, found the "principle on 
which the holding rests ... difficult to perceive," and said "[s]ince I am unable to 
identify a limitation on that federal power that would not also invalidate federal regula-
tion of state activities that I consider unquestionably permissible, I am persuaded that 
this statute is valid." /d. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
153. /d. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Recent support for this position is found in Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 
F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977). Justice Brennan in dissent argues that "[s]uch an approach, 
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The im.plications of National League of Cities as to the con-
stitutionality of a federal collective bargaining law are open to 
debate. Professor Benjamin Aaron shortly after the decision pre-
dicted that the Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963157 (an amendment 
of the FLSA) and Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967'"R [hereinafter referred to as ADEA] would be inapplicable 
to state and local government workers and said "prospects for a 
federal law establishing collective bargaining rights for employees 
of state and local governments appear to be virtually dead. " 159 
Others have taken a more cautious view, for example, contending 
that the decision, while perhaps not precluding such legislation, 
certainly puts into question the constitutionality of possible fed-
eral legislation dealing with collective bargaining by state and 
local employees. 160 
The ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue must 
await passage of such a law, and a· Supreme Court pronounce-
ment on whether labor relations involves an essential function 
and whether such a regulation directly displaces state choices. An 
early return oflower court cases indicates, however, that National 
League of Cities will be narrowly construed. Despite Justice Bren-
nan's ringing alarm that the case will have "profoundly perni-
cious consequences, " 161 these early cases in upholding the Equal . 
Pay Act162 and the ADEA suggest that there is room for interpre-
tive extension of federal regulation over the state and local em-
ployment relationship. 
· A Utah federal district court recently had occasion to apply 
National League of Cities in a suit brought by employees under 
the ADEA against school board officials.163 In denying a motion 
for summary judgment based on National League of Cities, the 
court held that though public education is an essential and inte-
however, is a thinly veiled rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy judgment that 
our system of government reserves to Congress." 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
157. 29 u.s.c. § 206 (1970). 
158. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
159. Address presented Aug. 9, 1976, at the annual meeting in Atlanta of the Section 
of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association. BNA DLR No. 158, D-1 at D-2 (1976). 
Also for general discussion, see Note, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local 
Governments: The Effect of National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 665 
(1977). 
160. Statement by former Undersecretary of Labor Michael Moskow. BNA DLR No. 
127, A-6, A-7 (1976). 
161. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
162. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1970). 
163. Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976). 
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gral state government function, the federal regulation does not 
unduly intrude upon or directly displace state choices. 16~ In reach-
ing its conclusion, the court used the balancing approach of the 
majority opinion as stressed by Justice Blackmun in his concur-
ring opinion. 165 In assessing whether a federal regulation causes a 
"direct" displacement of the states' power, the court said that it 
"necessarily requires a balancing of the competing national and 
state interests." 166 In addition to finding an overriding national 
interest, the court found that the "ADEA only imposes a limited 
negative obligation on the state employer . . . rather than an 
affirmative obligation to totally restructure an integral state op-
eration of the school board."167 The court also found support for 
its holding under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which 
permits appropriate federal legislation to enforce the amend-
ment, 168 a constitutional basis upheld after National League of 
Cities in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 169 
Other federal district courts have made similar rulings even 
though the Equal Pay Act is part of the FLSA, and both were 
expanded to cover state and local employees by the 1974 amend-
ments to the Act and are based on the commerce clause. 170 In 
164. !d. at 720. 
165. The court stated: "The majority opinion in National League of Cities does not 
rigidly protect the states as separate and independent sovereignties in the exercise of their 
integral governmental functions. The Court's analysis . . . indicates that the Court will 
balance the respective interests of federal and state governments in regulating economic 
activity." !d. at 719. 
166. !d. at 720. The court held that "Congress has a national interest in preventing 
arbitrary discrimination in employment on the basis of age ... [which is] particularly 
significant when balanced against the defendant's nominal interest in arbitrarily discrimi-
nating . . .. " !d. 
167. !d. 
168. !d. at 721. 
169. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The Court ruled that the eleventh amendment of the Con-
stitution does not bar the recovery of money damages by state employees who show that 
the state discriminated against them in violation of the Civil Rights Act. State sovereignty 
in other words is limited by section five of the fourteenth amendment. In the instant case, 
the Utah court stated that the fourteenth amendment is particularly applicable in the 
present case, where, if proven, the charges of age discrimination would constitute a denial 
of equal protection. Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976). 
170. Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y.1977); 
Usery v. Eastern Ky. Univ., No. CA 76-15 (E.D. Ky., Jan. 21, 1977), [1977] Gov'T EMPL. 
REL. REP. (BNA) 697: 13-14; Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. 
Cal. 1977}; Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976}; Brennan v. A & M 
Consolidated Independent School Dist., No. CA 74-H-1532 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 1976); 
Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Usery v. 
Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Usery v. Fort 
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Usery v. Allegheny County Institution District, 171 the question 
reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
in an Equal Pay Act case, and the court narrowly construed 
National League of Cities to hold that the tenth amendment 
restriction on the federal government does not preclude enforce-
ment of the federal regulation over the state's discriminatory per-
sonnel policy.172 Additionally, the court rejected the argument 
that since the Equal Pay Act was "housed" in the FLSA it must 
be "presumed to have been a commerce clause enactment," and 
instead found that authority for the federal regulation would exist 
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, even though the 
legislative history of that act "does not explicitly rely on the 
fourteenth amendment. " 173 
In seeking to evaluate the constitutionality of proposals for 
federal public sector bargaining legislation after National League 
of Cities, one must be mindful of the above guidelines, and the 
law must formulate the bargaining relationship in such a way as 
to avoid, if possible, impairing the states' abilities to function 
within the federal system. Further, if state and local labor rela-
tions are to be viewed as an essential function of the state, the 
bargaining obligations, if any, must not too deeply intrude on or 
displace a state's choice in these matters. In balancing the com-
peting interests of the national and state governments, the draft-
ing of any such bargaining law will obviously be difficult and such 
law must be drawn adroitly if not by divine inspiration. How that 
task might be accomplished is explored subsequently in the sec-
tion dealing with the constitutionality of specific proposals under 
different constitutional bases. 174 
B. Powers Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 5: Spending and 
Taxing for the General Welfare 
Though the majority opinion in National League of Cities 
limited the commerce clause as a constitutional basis for federal 
Madison Community School Dist., No. CA 75-62-1 (S.D. Iowa, Sept. 1, 1976); Christensen 
v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Useryv. Charleston County School Dist., No. 
CA 76-248 (D.S.C., Aug. 24, 1976); Usery v. Sioux City Community School Dist., No. 
CA 76-4024 (N.D. Iowa, Aug. 20, 1976); Riley v. University of Lowell, No. CA 76-1118-M 
(D. Mass., July 22, 1976). But see Usery v. Ownesboro-Daviess County Hosp., 423 F. 
Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1976), where the court used National League of Cities to interpret 
the FLSA definition of employer as excluding a state hospital from coverage. 
171. 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976). 
172. Jd. at 154-55. 
173. Jd. 
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regulation of state and local government labor relations, it did 
hold open the intriguing possibility that the ends sought to be 
accomplished by federal regulation, though unconstitutional on 
one basis, could be achieved under a different constitutional 
basis. As to whether a federal minimum wage or even a federal 
bargaining law could be constitutionally tied to a federal grant, 
the Court offered the following guidance: "We express no view as 
to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to 
affect integral operations of state governments by exercising au-
thority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such 
as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 175 
The second constitutional basis, section 5 of the fourteenth 
amendment (discussed below) was explicitly upheld subsequent 
to that opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 116 Here the Court found 
such power to be "plenary within the terms of the constitutional 
grant" and held that federal legislation regulating the states on 
that constitutional basis would not be an invasion of the states' 
sovereignty. 177 
With respect to the constitutionality of conditioning federal 
regulations, e.g., a bargaining law, on Congress' spending power, 
two areas must be examined: 1) The legitimacy of such an enact-
ment and 2) the limitations, if any, of that power. Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 1 establishes the right of the federal government to 
raise revenues through taxes and to spend that money for the 
general welfare of the nation.178 The issue at hand is whether 
Congress, in the exercise of its spending power, may condition 
disbursement upon compliance with federal requirements nor-
mally within the realm of state discretionary power. 
The authority of the federal government to impose terms and 
conditions upon which its contracts and grants shall be disbursed 
has long been established. The Supreme Court has held: "Like 
private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the 
unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine 
those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions 
174. See section IV infra. 
175. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. Justice Brennan, in 
dissent, also appears to accept the legitimacy of this statement. Id. at 880. 
176. 427 u.s. 445 (1976). 
177. Id. at 452-56. 
178. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 is set out at note 25 supra. 
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upon which it will make needed purchases."179 Furthermore, con-
ditioning federal monies on the requirement of a state's passing 
enabling legislation, e.g., for a federal/state unemployment com-
pensation program, has been upheld by the Supreme Court and 
found not to violate tenth amendment notions of state sover-
eignty.180 The concept has been dubbed "cooperative federalism" 
and often involves the use of federal funds to be matched by state 
funds for the common purpose laid down by federal law. 181 If a 
state fails to comply adequately, the federal government may cut 
off funds and/or compel compliance with the conditions by use of 
an injunction. 182 
In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 183 
the Supreme Court sustained the Hatch Act, 184 which conditions 
federal monies on certain state employees' refraining from parti-
san political activities, stating: 
While the United States is not concerned with, and has no power 
to regulate, local political activities as such of state officials, it 
does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allot-
ments to states shall be disbursed. 
The Tenth Amendment does not forbid the exercise of this 
power in the way that Congress has proceeded in this case . . . . 
The offer of benefits to a state by the United States dependent 
upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for 
the general welfare, is not unusual. 185 
It is, therefore, 9lear that Congress according to traditional 
Supreme Court analysis may validly attach conditions to its tax-
ing and spending programs pursuant to its enumerated powers. 
However, there are limitations to this power in that the condi-
tions must be reasonably related to the purposes of the spending 
179. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940). More recently, the Court 
in Lnu v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), said that "(t]he Federal Government has power 
to fix the terms on which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed." Id. at 
569. See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). 
180. Helveringv. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937). 
181. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 242 
(1975). 
182. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 
(1974); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); California Dep't of Human Resources 
Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smitli, 
392 u.s. 309 (1968). 
183. 330 u.s. 127 (1947). 
184. 5 u.s.c. § 1502 (1970). 
185. 330 U.S. at 143-44. 
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and taxing programs.186 Justice Cardozo made that point in 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 181 where he noted that the Court 
was not saying "that a tax is valid . . . if it is laid upon the 
condition that a state may escape its operation through the adop-
tion of a statute unrelated in subject matter to activities fairly 
within the scope of national policy and power."188 
Another argued limitation, rejected by the Court, is that the 
contractual consent for federal funds obtained by the federal gov-
ernment from the state was exacted by undue influence or duress. 
In Steward Machine Co., the Court, in upholding the unemploy-
ment compensation program over arguments by the state that, 
due to the state's poor position caused by the Great Depression, 
refusal to comply with the federal offer of money was impossible, 
observed: 
Nothing in the case suggests the exertion of a power akin to 
undue influence, if we assume that such a concept can ever be 
applied with fitness to the relations between state and nation 
. : .. We cannot say that she [the state] was acting, not of her 
unfettered will, but under the strain of a persuasion equivalent 
to undue influence, when she chose to have relief administered 
under laws of her own making, by agents of her own selection, 
instead of under federal laws, administered by federal officers, 
with all the ensuing evils, at least to many minds, of federal 
patronage and power. There would be a strange irony, indeed, 
if her choice were now to be annulled on the basis of an assumed 
duress in the enactment of a statute which her courts have ac-
cepted as a true expression of her will . . . . We think the choice 
must stand.189 
A final area of possible limitation on conditions under the 
spending power falls under the label of unconstitutional condi-
tions. This limitation may occur when the government conditions 
the extension of a benefit or privilege to an individual recipient 
. 
186. See generally Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search 
For Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 293 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Northwestern Comment]. 
A district court in Romeo Pub. Schools v. HEW recently held that federal funds cannot 
be cut off where federal regulations do not clearly prohibit the alleged noncompliance. 
[1977] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 706:10. A recent Fifth Circuit case, Florida v. 
Mathews, 526 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1976), provides an illustration of a court's assessment of 
reasonable relatedness. 
187. 301 u.s. 548 (1937). 
188. Id. at 590. The Court added that in determining national goals, the "Congress 
must have the benefit of a fair margin of discretion." Id. at 594. 
189. Id. at 590. 
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upon his relinquishing or foregoing a constitutional right. 190 Be-
cause the law permitting federal conditions in the disbursement 
of federal monies is apparently well settled, relatively few recent 
cases exist which challenge that premise. However, one recent 
case, Vermont u. Brinegar, 191 illustrates and summarizes an appli-
cation of the above principles where federal aid for highway con-
struction and beautification under the Federal Highway Beautifi-
cation Act of 1965192 was conditioned on the states' instituting 
programs for effective control and maintenance of outdoor adver-
tising. While states were given considerable freedom in devising 
such programs, the federal government required displaced sign 
owners to be compensated for removal of their advertising. 193 To 
induce compliance, the federal government agreed to pay 
seventy-five percent of the compensation with the states paying 
twenty-five percent. The federal statute also provided that ten 
percent of the state's highway funds be withheld in the event of 
noncompliance. 194 Such impoundment occurred, and the state 
challenged the federal right to condition funds in such a manner. 
The court upheld the federal government's right and noted: 
"[S]uch a conditioning of federal funds upon the accomplish-
ment of certain requirements does not run afoul of the Constitu-
tion."195 The court rejected the argument that the advertiser-
reimbursement provision violated the tenth amendment and 
found that the federal government had a legitimate "national 
interest. " 196 
To summarize the federal constitutional guidelines on the 
authority of Congress to regulate under article I, section 8, clause 
1, the court must find both that the regulation is reasonably 
related to a legitimate national goal and that the state's compli-
ance, although induced, was not coerced. The first criterion is 
usually easily met, as a court normally applies the doctrine of 
presumed constitutionality when construing terms and condi-
190. See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1960). 
See also Note, Unconstitutional Conditions; Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 
CAL, L. REv. 443 (1966). 
191, 379 F. Supp. 606 (D. Vt. 1974). 
192. 23 u.s.c. §§ 131, 135-136, 319 (1970). 
193. ld. § 131(g). 
194. ld. § 131(b). 
195. Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 617 (D. Vt. 1974). 
196. ld. at 616. For support of this principle, see Lamm v. Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202 (lOth 
Cir. 1971). 
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tions enforced by the conditional spending power.197 The second 
criterion, permitting persuasion but not coercion, has not been 
used extensively by the courts since the states have the option of 
refusing federal funds. Though the court in Brinegar stated that 
a federal regulation ceases to be voluntary when "economic cata-
strophe" threatened the state if a grant were refused, 198 the gov-
erning rule was expressed by the Supreme Court in Oklahoma v. 
United States Civil Service Commission189 that if a state may 
adopt the "simple expedient" of not yielding to alleged federal 
coercion, then the courts will not find any violation of state sover-
eignty.2oo 
It should also be noted that conditions promulgated after 
application by the states for federal funding under a categorical 
grant may be subsequently applied. 201 Additionally, a recent 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case202 held that federal stan-
dards not specifically enumerated in an enabling statute of a 
block grant may nevertheless be attached to the funds. In the 
Fourth Circuit case, the federal government had required state 
submission of an environmental impact statement necessitated 
by the National Environmental Policy Act203 before the construc-
tion of a state prison medical center funded by Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration monies.204 
The question of how the Supreme Court might assess a fed-
eral collective bargaining mandate tied to federal funding based 
on congressional authority from article I, section 8, clause 1 is 
open to debate. If one were to look only to judicial precedents, the 
prediction of constitutionality of a carefully drafted act would be 
simple enough; but if the Court were willing to overturn a century 
of precedent in National League of Cities, it might also be in-
clined to do the same in this instance.205 There are, however, 
197. See Northwestern Comment, note 186 supra, at 305. 
198. Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 617 (D. Vt. 1974). 
199. 330 u.s. 127 (1947). 
200. Id. at 143. 
201. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 970 (4th Cir. 
1963). 
202. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). 
203. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1970). 
204. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). 
205. This issue by analogy may be resolved in the foreseeable future as the National 
Institute of Municipal Law .Officers [hereinafter cited as the NIMLO] is preparing to 
litigate the recent amendments to the Unemployment Compensation Act to certain state 
and local employees which become effective January 1, 1978. Federal Unemployment 
378 SoUTH CAROLINA LAw REviEW [Vol. 29 
grounds for distinguishing the two types of cases, each dealing 
with a different constitutional base. Assuming arguendo that 
state labor relations is an essential function of state sovereignty, 
the second criterion of National League of Cities, namely, man-
datory displacement of state choices, would arguably not be pres-
ent since recipients of federal aid are not required to accept fed-
eral monies, but must voluntarily elect to do so. Therefore, as-
suming legislation could be drafted that would induce passage of 
a state bargaining bill, modeled after federal guidelines, as a 
condition for receiving federal aid and assuming such regulation 
is reasonably related to a legitimate national end embodied in the 
aid program, there would appear to be adequate grounds for the 
constitutionality of such legislation.206 The legality of such legisla-
tion of course depends on how it might be drafted, a subject 
discussed below. 
Compensation Amendments of 1976, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 (West Supp. 1977). County of 
Los Angeles v. Marshall, No. 77-2023 (D.D.C. Nov. 28, 1977). See Memo from NIMLO 
President Conard Mattox, Jr., April25, 1977. U.S. Department of Labor's Solicitor Gen-
eral, William J. Kilberg, takes the position that such law is constitutional notwithstanding 
National [,eague of Cities, see Staff Data H.R. 10210, note 65 supra, at 111, whereas Karen 
J. Lewis, legislative attorney at the Library of Congress, states that the question of consti-
tutionality is an open one, Staff Data H.R. 10210, note 65 supra, at 118. The outcome of 
this case may well tum on the degree to which Congress attempts to make the states 
absorb the financial costs of the program, and how much costs are involved. That is, since 
the program is funded by the federal tax to which state and local governments are not 
subject, added coverage of public employees under the new amendments will likely in-
crease the costs of administration which, if significant, could l!rguably intrude into a 
state's sovereignty within the meaning of the National League of Cities case. Should this 
problem prove insurmountable, federal bargaining legislation could of course avoid this 
dilemma by a properly drafted law as discussed subsequently. On Dec. 29, 1977, the 
district court rejected the request for a preliminary injunction stating that the likelihood 
of plaintiffs succeeding on the merits is minimal and that National League of Cities v. 
Usery is distinguishable in that FLSA regulations were mandatory whereas unemploy-
ment compensation regulations are optional. BNA DLR No. 2, D-1, Jan. 4, 1978. 
206. For recent support of this proposition, see City of Macon v. Marshall, 96 
L.R.R.M. 2797 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 28, 1977) which held that federal collective bargaining 
requirements under the federal grant program of the Urban Mass Transportation Act do 
not directly displace essential state choices guarded by the tenth amendment under com-
merce power analysis nor compel state participation in the program. The effect of the 
federal regulation, in the court's view, was to induce but not force compliance with the 
federal requirements, thus not coming within the rationale of National League of Cities 
v. Usery. See also Dupler v. City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Me. 1976), where the 
court upheld the Federal Food Stamp Act, authorized under the spending power, over 
claims that it interfered with tenth amendment rights. Of course, the type of program to 
which the condition is attached is a policy question of extreme importance as well as a 
legal issue. For example, if a bargaining condition could and would be attached to the 
general revenue sharing law, a state's refusal to accept the federal monies could have 
adverse effects on poor and minority groups. See Sklar, Impact of Revenue Sharing on 
Minorities and the Poor, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 93 (1975). 
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C. Federal Regulation Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Historically, section 5 of the fourteenth amendment author-
izing Congress to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions 
of the amendment has been interpreted as a plenary power.207 In 
1976, the Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer208 reaffirmed 
that principle in upholding the application of amendments of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act209 to certain state and local 
employees, finding that the amendments were explicitly based on 
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.210 The Court, while up-
holding the federal regulation, noted that respondents had not 
contended that the substantive provisions of title VII211 were not 
a proper exercise of authority. 212 The Court rejected the argument 
that the eleventh amendment shielded a state from federal regu-
lation permitting attorney fees against the state. Instead, the 
Court broadly defined the federal authority as a permissible in-
terference with state sovereignty: "When Congress acts pursuant 
to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary 
within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising au-
thority under one section of a constitutional amendment whose 
other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state 
authority."213 The Court had earlier in National League of Cities 
reserved judgment on this issue.214 Subsequent federal court rul-
ings have restricted the National League of Cities case and as 
discussed earlier,215 in upholding the Equal Pay Act,216 have noted 
that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides ample, inde-
pendent constitutional authority for such federal regulation of the 
states without unduly impairing states' sovereignty.217 
207. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); 
Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964-Source and Scope of Congressional Power, 60 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 574 (1965). 
208. 427 u.s. 445 (1976). 
209. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to 
2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975). 
210. 427 U.S. at 453 n.9. 
211. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
212. 427 U.S. at 456 n.11. 
213. ld. at 456. 
214. "We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress 
seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it 
under other sections of the Constitution such as ... § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17 (1976). 
215. See note 161 and accompanying text supra. 
216. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970). 
217. See, e.g., Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1977). The 
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Whether a federal collective bargaining law would be author-
ized on this constitutional basis depends on whether Congress 
could justify such a law as an enforcement of the equal protection 
constraints of the fourteenth amendment by "appropriate legisla-
tion."218 Those seeking to bring about federal bargaining legisla-
tion on this basis argue that for the federal government to estab-
lish a scheme of private sector bargaining under the NLRA and 
yet not to afford it to employees in the public sector would be a 
denial of equal protection; to avoid this, appropriate legislation 
is necessary.219 Since there is no fundamental right involved,220 the 
traditional equal protection assessment would consider whether 
the legislative classification by some states, providing coverage of 
private employees but excluding public employees, was arbitrary 
or bore a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental inter-
est.221 
There is ample authority for concluding that the traditional 
distinction between private and public employment is justified, 
and that there is a rational basis for this disparate treatment to 
preclude finding a violation of equal protection.222 Lower courts 
have also permitted a state to choose between different categories 
of public employees, according bargaining rights to some but not 
to others without running afoul of the fourteenth amendment.223 
In sum, it is predictable that a complainant alleging violation of 
court found authority for the federal regulation even though the legislative history of the 
act did not explicitly rely on the fourteenth amendment. /d. at-155:'See also text accompa-
nying note 170 supra. 
218. In defining "appropriate legislation" the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 
445 (1976), noted that legislation may be constitutional under the fourteenth amendment 
th'ough it is "constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." /d. at 456. 
219. For a discussion of this argument, see Brown, note 4 supra, at 690-92. It should 
be noted that concepts of equal protection developed under the fourteenth amendment, 
making the fifth amendment of the Constitution applicable to state governments, are 
likewise applicable to the federal government through the due process clause in the fifth 
amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The argument as stated, however, 
should fail under fourteenth amendment analysis, since there is no state action as required 
by the amendment. 
220. See, e.g., Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir. 
1969). 
221. See generally Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal 
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classification, 62 GEo. L.J. 
1071 (1974). 
222. E.g., United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 404 U.S. 802, aff'g 325 F. Supp. 
879 (D.D.C. 1971). 
223. See, e.g., Beauboeufv. Delgado College, 303 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1969), aff'd 
in part, 428 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1970); Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 59 v. Ober-
meyer, 275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966). 
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equal protection would most likely lose, but whether a congres-
sional assessment that disparate treatment existed between pri-
vate and public employees in their bargaining rights justifies ap-
propriate legislation may well be another matter. The fourteenth 
amendment in authorizing corrective legislation by Congress22~ 
permits some degree of congressional discretion in making sub-
stantive decisions about what state action is discriminatory 
above and beyond the judicial view of the matter.225 Therefore, 
there exists an argument, albeit weak, that a state is violating the 
equal protection clause by creating state legislative classifications 
permitting collective bargaining by some private employees (not 
covered by the NLRA) while providing lesser rights to its public 
employees or no bargaining rights or banning all rights to collec-
tively bargain. 226 
Thus, the prospects of finding permissible constitutional 
bases for federal regulation of state and local labor relations, in 
view of the above discussion of congressional powers under the 
commerce clause, the spending clause, and the fourteenth 
amendment, suggest that appropriately drawn bargaining legisla-
tion might well withstand judicial scrutiny. Specific federal bar-
gaining proposals and their constitutionality are discussed below.-
224. The Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases has held that the "legislation 
which Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the 
rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation," to overcome those state laws forbidden 
by§ 1 of the fourteenth amendment. 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883). 
225. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), where the Court rejected a state 
argument that an exercise of congressional power under § 5 "can only be sustained if the 
judicial branch determines that the state law is prohibited by the provisions of the 
Amendment that Congress sought to enforce." Id. at 648. The Court added that the 
legislation would be upheld if the Court could perceive the basis upon which Congress 
might predicate a judgment. I d. at 653-56. For the argument that Congress must exercise 
its discretion to "reasonable perceptions," see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
For further discussion of Congress' power to expand judicial interpretations of state action, 
see Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. 
L. REv. 603 (1975). An interesting illustration, somewhat analogous to this analysis, of how 
a court may even seek out an apparently unconceived legislative basis in upholding a law 
is found in a recent Third Circuit opinion upholding the Equal Pay Act under the four-
teenth amendment even though the legislative history showed that Congress had really 
used the commerce clause power. Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d 
Cir. 1976); Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Usery 
v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). 
226. For collection of state labor laws that fit the above categories, see CCH, State 
Labor Laws p. 50,079. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, §§ 1-12 (West 1971); 
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§§ 423.1-.216 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.3 (Purdon 1964). 
382 SoUTH CAROLINA L.I\W REviEw [Vol. 29 
IV. FEDERAL CONTROLS: A PROPOSAL FOR CONSTITUTIONALLY 
SOUND FEDERAL PROCEDURES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The threshold question facing Congress in any future deliber-
ations on the propriety of federal bargaining legislation is whether 
there is constitutional authority for such federal control. Leaving 
the wisdom of such legislation to Congress, 227 several proposals 
have been suggested since National League of Cities that most 
likely would pass constitutional scrutiny based on judicial pre-
cedent to date. 
A. Current Proposals 
1. Amending NLRA or Creating NPERA. -Two bills with 
far reaching implications have been before congressional commit-
tees in recent years. The first would amend the NLRA to include 
state and local employees228 and the second, the National Public 
Employment Relations Act [hereinafter referred to as 
NPERA], 229 would establish a separate national public labor re-
lations program. Each bill would permit strikes by public em-
ployees, union security provisions, and the possibility of a very 
wide range of bargainable subjects. 230 Associated with the scope 
of bargaining issue is the uncertainty of its limitations231 and what 
227. For treatment of conceptual and legal difficulties relating to the propriety of 
federal legislation, see Brovm, note 4 supra, at 681-90. 
228. H.R. 9730, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 3294, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). For 
detailed discussion, see McCann & Smiley, note 5 supra. 
229. H.R. 1987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), formerly H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973). H.R. 1987 differs from its predecessor, H.R. 8677, in that it does not contain a 
mandatory agency shop provision and the parties are permitted to submit any and all 
unresolved issues to final and binding arbitration. Id. See [1977] Gov'T EMPL. R.EL. REP. 
(BNA) RF-138 at 51:181; S. 3295, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). This bill is discussed in 
Brown, note 4 supra, at 712-16. See also Baird, National Legislation for Public Employees: 
"End Run on the Wagner Act?," 611LL. B.J. 410 (1973). 
230. The broad language of the NLRA which requires good faith bargaining over 
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), 
has been liberally interpreted. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 
342 (1958); Note, The Scope of Collective Bargaining, 74 YALE L.J. 1472 (1965); Note, 
Application of the Mandatory-Permissive Dichotomy to the Duty to Bargain and Unilat-
eral Action: A Review and Reevaluation, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 918 (1974). 
231. In the public sector, a similar expansion of bargainable subjects has occurred. 
For example, a decision interpreting New York's bargaining statute expanded the scope 
by establishing all items as mandatory subjects "except in cases where some other applic-
able statutory provision explicitly and definitively prohibits the public employer from 
making an agreement as to a particular term or condition of employment." Board ofEduc. 
v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 
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effect bargained-for contractual provisions would have on poten-
tially conflicting statutory provisions such as tenure, merit sys-
tem, or benefit statutes.232 Whether the federal control would 
preempt inconsistent state legislation raises a corollary di-
lemma.233 
The uncertain effect that two of these items in particu-
lar-strikes and the permissible scope of bargaining, including 
questions of preemption-might have on a state in conducting its 
affairs raises a serious question as to whether mandatory federal 
regulation expressly providing for such is an improper invasion of 
a state's sovereignty within the meaning of National League of 
Cities. 234 Though a federal bill as described above might interfere 
less with those states already having a similar comprehensive 
law, those states are relatively few; and in a state with little or 
no existing statutory collective bargaining law, it is apparent that 
significant changes would occur in a state's structuring of its 
employment relationship. Assuming that public employees would 
utilize the federal rights, state compliance with the bargaining 
requirement almost certainly would result in additional adminis-
trative costs, reporting obligations, potential modifications of ex-
isting working conditions and benefit plans, 235 and possible bar-
gaining on subjects previously within the employers' preroga-
tives. 
(1972). See also Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MicH. 
L. REV. 885 (1973). 
232. Of course, such problems are not insurmountable and have been dealt with in 
state statutes by management rights clauses reserving subject areas to the employer and 
specific legislation giving precedence to statutory law. See generally Brown, note 4 supra, 
at 701-02. 
233. This subject is discussed in Chanin & Snyder, note 116 supra, in which the 
authors categorize the problem areas of preemption into three areas: (1) state statutes in 
conflict with the federal statutes, (2) state collective bargaining statutes, and (3) state 
statutes establishing terms and conditions of public employment. They conclude generally 
that the supremacy clause of the Constitution will permit the federal control to predomi-
nate but that state prerogatives could be reserved by appropriate regulations. Id. at 236. 
For speculation on the "dire consequences" to be caused by a federal bargaining law, see 
Lieberman, note 116 supra. 
234. For an argument that even a state law providing for mandatory bargaining 
improperly intrudes into state sovereignty, albeit on different legal grounds, see Petro, 
Sovereignty and Compulsory Public Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 25 (1974). 
235. There is some debate as to whether unionized employees may exact more bene-
fits from a public employer than nonunionized employees. See, e.g., D. STANLEY, MANAG-
ING LocAL GovERNMENT UNDER UNION PRESsURE 60 (1972); Hall & Carroll, The Effect of 
Teachers' Organizations on Salaries and Class Size, 26lNDUS. &LAB. REI.. REv. 834 (1973); 
Ashenfelter, The Effect of Unionization on Wages in the Public Sector: The Case of 
Firefighters, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 191 (1971). 
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Applying the guidelines of National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 236 it is apparent that labor relations of a state is an essen-
tial function of its operation since without a properly maintained 
work force there could not be an effective operation.237 That point, 
however, is not without contention. It may be argued that the 
Court's decision was aimed at prohibiting the directing of certain 
operations by the state (hours, schedules, etc.), rather than 
merely superimposing a set of federal procedures to be followed 
by the states in dealing with their employees to reach those deci-
sions. 
In that respect, the argument continues, a good faith bar-
gaining obligation is more akin to the federal obligation of equal 
pay for equal work, a procedural requirement not displacing ulti-
mate employer choices.238 That issue is not easily resolved at this 
point. A preliminary assessment requires the author to predict, 
however, that such potentially far-reaching laws would call for 
the Supreme Court's judgment on the very serious question of the 
states' abilities to continue operation (if employees strike) and 
the states' abilities to determine the employment benefits 
through a legislative process. This could compel a conclusion, 
perhaps by bootstrap logic, that a federal bargaining law as de-
scribP.d above would be an essential function of the state. 
The touchstone issue more likely is whether such a law 
"directly displace[s] the States' freedom to structure integral 
operations in areas of traditional government functions." 239 The 
same factors mentioned above-strikes and potential preemption 
of state laws by the federal law or through bargaining under 
it-again must be dealt with under this second criterion from 
National League of Cities. The increased incidence of public 
employee strikes in past years has been noticeable. For example, 
in 1973 there was a loss of nearly three million man-days of work 
caused by nearly 400 work stoppages by public employees.240 
236. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court explicitly named the types of operations typically 
an integral part of the state's activities: "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, 
public health, and parks and recreation." Id. at 851. 
237. [d. 
238. See Usery v. Allegheny County lnst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1977), where 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was distinguished by the court 
partially on that basis in upholding the Equal Pay Act, an amendment to the FLSA. See 
also Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976). 
239. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). 
240. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Report No. 434, WoRK STOP· 
PAGES IN GOVERNMENT 3 (1974). This was up from 455,000 lost work days and 142 work 
stoppages in 1966. ld. 
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Though the total percentage of time lost is relatively small, espe-
cially when compared with time lost in the private sector,241 it 
must be remembered that strikes are outlawed in most states.242 
Therefore, the potential for directly disrupting and perhaps dis-
placing state choices by the economic coercion of a strike looms 
as a very real possibility. This possibility, combined with the 
probable preemption of state laws and statutory employee benefit 
schemes, would normally lead to the likely conclusion that a fed-
eral statute would directly displace state choices and that the 
federal regulation passed under the commerce clause would be 
prohibited by the tenth amendment limitation.243 One significant 
factor, however, remains unstated: under neither bill is there a 
mandatory obligation to agree to anything, only to meet and bar-
gain in good faith. 244 Thus, there need not be any displacement 
of state choices or employment structures nor relinquishment of 
government activities unless the state voluntarily chooses to per-
mit it. Nevertheless, though that factor may ameliorate the scope 
of bargaining and the preemption issue as the decisive considera-
tion, the right of public employees to strike under these laws most 
likely would cause them to be found unconstitutional in exceed-
ing the proper boundaries of the commerce clause. 
In assessing the above criteria, it must be remembered that 
the Court in National League of Cities employed a test balancing 
the federal and state interests. Therefore, in addition to the above 
considerations, the Court in evaluating those interests undoubt-
edly would consider that fewer than twenty states have compre-
hensive bargaining legislation for public employees, that bargain-
ing by public employees is statutorily prohibited in some states, 
and that there is considerable current labor unrest including 
strikes by public employees. The Court may take cognizance that 
it was these factors existing in the private sector some years ago 
which prompted the enactment of the NLRA. That Act begins by 
241. In 1971, for example, time lost for strikes by government workers (including 
federal employees) was .03% of total work time, compared with .32% for the private, non-
farm economy, cited in Brown, note 4 supra, at 704 n.96. 
242. Many of the strikes occur in states which permit lawful strikes by public employ-
ees, though on a limited basis, e.g., Pennsylvania; also there is a high incidence of strikes 
in states without a bargaining statute, e.g., Ohio. See also Shaw & Clark, Jr., Public 
Sector Strikes: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J. LAW & Eouc. 217 (1973); Ligtenberg, Some 
Effect of Strikes and Sanctions- Legal and Practical, 2 J. LAw & Eouc. 235 (1973). 
243. U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
244. For example, there is no mandate on the NLRA that concessions must be given 
or an agreement reached. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). 
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stating: "The denial by some employers of the right to organize 
and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of 
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial 
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of 
burdening or obstructing commerce. "245 
Additionally, when considering that in 1971 the interstate 
purchases made by state and local governments amounted to over 
135 billion dollars or over ninety percent of the total state and 
local government expenditures and accounted for over ten per-
cent of the gross national product and affected over thirteen mil-
lion employees,248 the consequence of the states' failure to regulate 
their labor relations adequately might well justify a conclusion by 
the Court that there is an overriding federal interest to act. 
Though such a prediction is tenuous at best, one can conclude at 
a minimum that such a holding is not necessarily precluded 
under the commerce clause as interpreted by National League of 
Cities. 
The constitutionality of the two federal bargaining laws dis-
cussed above might be based on article I, section 8, clause 1 of 
the Constitution, which permits the federal government to condi-
tion funds it disburses to a state recipient on that state's agree-
ment to comply with federal regulations.247 Since that is not a 
current proposal, it is only necessary to note that such federal 
conditions would have to be reasonably related to a federal pro-
gram that the federal government was funding and voluntarily 
agreed to by the state: both requirements are distinctly possible 
while staying within the constitutional guidelines described in 
earlier sections. 248 
With respect to basing the federal laws described above on 
the constitutional authority of section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, though this power seems plenary after Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 2411 little can be added to the earlier discussion, which noted 
that Congress would have to justify the law as a means of preclud-
245. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), upheld in NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
246. See text accompanying notes 92 & 93 supra. 
247. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 is set out at note 25 supra. 
248. A holding favoring constitutionality is encouraged by Justice Rehnquist's major-
ity opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Justice Rehnquist held that a 
state's sovereignty is not improperly infringed upon when a state is compelled by federal 
statute to pay attorney fees from its treasury to successful plaintiffs where the state has 
not treated its employee in accordance with law. ld. 
249. ld. 
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ing invidious discrimination or a way to enforce the equal protec-
tion requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 250 There is no 
current proposal suggesting this as a constitutional basis. 
2. NEA Proposal. - Another current proposal for federal 
bargaining legislation, though still in the formative stages, is 
being put forth by the National Education Association 
[hereinafter referred to as NEA].251 In drafting the statute, NEA 
general counsel, Robert Chanin, will attempt to modify earlier 
NEA proposals to meet the guidelines of National League of 
Cities in several ways. First, rather than abandoning the right to 
strike, he suggests retaining it and adding a proviso expressly 
authorizing a state to prohibit or limit the right by statute.252 This 
would permit a continuation. of the right to strike in states where 
it is now authorized.253 
A second provision of the NEA proposal deals with proce-
dures for resolving bargaining impasses. Rather than having 
binding interest arbitration where an arbitrator would be empow-
ered to impose upon the states "specified expenditures, personnel 
policies, operating procedures, etc.," the NEA will propose 
"nonbinding recommendations for the terminal step" with a 
proviso "expressly authorizing a state to enact legislation making 
the recommendations binding if it chose to do so."254 A third 
provision, formerly granting federal preemptive powers over state 
statutes, would instead take a nonpreemptive approach permit-
ting the states to determine substantive terms and conditions of 
employment including retirement, tenure, etc., by statute in the 
future. 255 
The chances of such a proposal meeting the constitutional 
250. See text accompanying notes 207-23 supra. 
251. See [1977] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 693:12-13. 
252. Chanin notes that "[a]lthough this approach places an affirmative burden 
upon the states to take legislative action in order to avoid federal intrusion, we do not 
believe that this is the type of forced relinquishment of decision-making that the Court 
found unacceptable in National League of Cities." [1977] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 
693:13. 
253. Id. 
254. Reading this provision with the first, Chanin notes that several bargaining struc-
tures could result, including "nonbinding recommendations with the right to strike unless 
the teacher organization waives that right in order to secure a binding decision. At worst, 
they could have what is available under most of the current public sector collective 
bargaining statutes-that is, nonbinding recommendations with a strike prohibition." I d. 
255. Chanin points out that this result does not cause NEA any real difficulty "since 
most of the statutes in question are protective in nature and have the support of NEA's 
state affiliates." Id. at 13. 
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guidelines of National League of Cities, as discussed above, ap-
pear good. It minimizes the disruptive aspects of the earlier fed-
eral legislation and would not appear to impair the sovereignty 
of a state, in the sense that a state need not agree to any employee 
demands.256 Using the same approach and rationale, it would also 
appear possible to base such a law on the spending power of the 
Constitution. 
3. Other Proposals. - A third set of proposals for bargain-
ing legislation comes from two public employer groups, the 
American Association of School Administrators [hereinafter re-
ferred to as AASA] and the National Public Employer Labor 
Relations Association [hereinafter referred to as NPELRA]. 
Both propose model bills for state legislation, though each could 
also be the basis of a federal law. · 
The NPELRA proposal is still in its formative stages; and, 
although it has many enlightened and desirable features, it ap-
pears doomed to the same consequence as the amendment to the 
NLRA discussed above because it permits a limited right to 
strike. 257 The proposal by AASA is intended as a model public 
employee collective bargaining law for states, though the AASA 
disclaims it is urging support of bargaining legislation.258 Rather, 
it suggests that it is helping "protect the public interest" where 
school systems have been confronted with the bargaining issue.259 
Its coverage extends to local public employers.260 It provides for 
exclusive recognition, representation elections, unfair labor prac-
tices, a scope of bargaining excluding statutory matters, fair rep-
resentation by the union,261 and it expressly prohibits strikes.262 In 
view of its treatment of strikes, this proposed bill could provide 
a working model for federal collective bargaining legislation and 
satisfy the constitutional guidelines of National League of Cities. 
256. A countervailing argument, of course, is that the strike potential is still a very 
real possibility in that situation; as was illustrated earlier, notwithstanding strike prohibi-
tions in the public sector, strikes persist and could therefore bring the operations of state 
governments to a complete standstill. This argument then leads to the Supreme Court's 
balancing approach in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The 
question is which weighs heavier-the possibility of a small percentage of strikes in view 
of the states injunctive power to compel the strikers return or a perceived national interest 
in providing bargaining rights for public employees. 
257. [1976) Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 673: B-9 to -12. 
258. [1977) Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) RF-135 at 51:451-69. 
259. ld. at 451. 
260. ld. at 453. 
261. ld. at 463. 
262. ld. at 465. 
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It would perhaps be ironic, but not without precedent, for an 
employer-initiated bargaining proposal to be passed into law.263 
B. Possible Legislation Based on Federal Minimum Standards 
After National League of Cities, what is generally required 
for constitutional legislative authority is a carefully and artfully 
drawn federal regulation, tailored in such a way as both to pre-
serve and to remain sensitive to the prerogatives of the states, 
while at the same time creating an appropriate system for collec-
tive bargaining which fulfills a congressionally perceived national 
need. In meeting that perhaps quixotic charge, the following pas-
sage from the National League of Cities case, discussing the lim-
its of federal legislation under the commerce clause as con-
strained by the tenth amendment, provides guidance: "Congress 
may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the states 
its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of 
integral government functions are to be made."264 
An initial inquiry is whether that language is to be read as 
prohibiting congressional imposition of a bargaining process 
which permits the states to retain ultimate control over the sub-
stantive decisions involved in rendering traditional government 
services. Alternatively, this language may be interpreted as 
merely saying that Congress may not dictate to the states its 
substantive decisions. In other words, did the Court intend to 
prohibit only federally substituted judgments on a state's essen-
tial substantive decisions affecting its integral operations? Or, 
did it also intend to include the internal processes by which per-
sonnel matters are discussed and negotiated? 
The difficulty of accepting the latter, broader interpretation 
is underscored in Justice Stevens' dissent where he notes that 
state sovereignty is certainly penetrable by the federal govern-
ment in requiring "the State to act impartially when it hires or 
fires [a state employee], to withhold taxes from his paycheck, 
263. An analogous situation arose in the late 1960's when CorneiJ University officials 
filed a petition with the NLRB asking it to assert jurisdiction over private college employ-
ers. The request apparently was made because the New York State bargaining Jaw at that 
time provided what the employer felt were insufficient unfair labor practice provisions 
applicable to labor unions, whereas the federal law was broader. See Ferguson, Collective 
Bargaining in Universities and Colleges, 19 LAB. L.J. 778, 800 (1968). 
264. 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). Obviously inherent in any federal regulation requiring 
procedural bargaining obligations is displacement of state choices, and so perhaps the best 
test after all is a balancing test. 
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[and] to observe safety regulations when he is performing his 
job."2sr, 
Different approaches for federal regulation are by now appar-
ent and can be categorized as based on the (1) commerce clause; 
(2) spending power conditioning federal grants on compliance; (3) 
federal/state cooperative programs under the spending power 
conditioning federal grants on a state passing appropriate legisla-
tion that meets federal standards; and (4) fourteenth amend-
ment. Within this context, a proposal for federal bargaining legis-
lation is made below, based on minimum federal standards. The 
proposal can have as its constitutional base at least any of the 
first three approaches and possibly the fourth without, in the 
author's judgment, unduly infringing on state sovereignty as pre-
sented in National League of Cities. 
In drafting federal bargaining legislation for state and local 
employees, it would be unfortunate and shortsighted to assume 
there is no difference between the public and private sectors and 
to place public employees automatically under the NLRA, even 
if constitutionally permissible. Rather, there are so many differ-
ences between the states and within a particular state as how best 
to approach labor relations, that a uniform comprehensive federal 
regulation might well stunt legislative innovations now taking 
place in the states, albeit on a somewhat piecemeal basis. On the 
other hand, without federal prompting there could continue to be 
"underregulation and non-regulation" of labor relations in many 
states which now deny minimum bargaining rights to a large 
number of public employees.266 Therefore, in establishing a sys-
tem of public sector labor relations, certain broad procedural 
minimum standards of essential bargaining rights could be pro-
vided and protected by federal guidelines while leaving the de-
tails of implementation and substantive decision-making to the 
states. This would meet the essential needs of public employees 
and at the same time accommodate some of the legitimate state 
interests of sovereignty while reserving control of labor relations 
to state officials familiar with the intricacies of state fiscal, legis-
lative, and political structures. Under this system, any state with 
265. ld. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Arguably, of course, some of these penetra-
tions may be based on constitutional authority under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment or the U.S. CaNsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, spending power. 
266. See Brown, Federal Legislation for Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A Mini-
mum Standards Approach, 5 U. TaL. L. REv. 681, 717 (1974). 
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a law in substantial conformity would be given authority to ad-
minister that law under the general supervision of a federal 
agency, which would monitor compliance. Any state failing to act 
or acting in nonconformity would be subject to the provisions of 
the federal guidelines administered by a federal coordinating 
agency. By providing the states broad discretion to fashion rules 
of implementation and to determine substantive areas of bargain-
ing, such as scope of bargaining and impasse resolution, this ap-
proach could minimize the inherent tension resulting from the 
federal government's regulation of the states' labor policies. 
The broad procedural minimum standards promulgated by 
the federal government should provide the rights essential to 
meaningful bargaining and a basic legal framework within which 
the bargaining may take place. Controversial nonessential items 
and those obviously touching on attributes of state sovereignty 
such as the limited right to strike, interest arbitration, bargaining 
by supervisors, union security provisions, and bargainable sub-
jects covered by state law could be omitted by the federal guide-
lines and left to the discretion of the individual state. The essen-
tial minimum standards to be adopted by the states would cer-
tainly include the following provisions: 
(1) Organizational and collective bargaining rights for non-
supervisory, nonelected public employees with any resulting 
agreements being enforceable and subject to grievance arbitra-
tion; 
(2) an agency, adequately funded and provided with effec-
tive remedies, to administer the state labor relations program, to 
resolve representation issues and unfair labor practices, and to 
aid in the resolution of bargaining impasses by providing for me-
diation and factfinding services; 
(3) secret ballot elections, exclusive recognition, and the 
designation by the agency of appropriate bargaining units based 
on the common criteria of community of interest and minimum 
fragmentation; 
(4) procedures calling for good-faith bargaining, though 
without obligation to agree to any terms, over "wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment" on a nonpreemptive 
basis, with the precise scope of subjects left to the states except 
that any resulting state regulation could not significantly under-
cut the rights granted by this section, and with the states being 
able to establish management rights provisions within the same 
limitation; 
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(5) procedural limitations on the conduct of the bargaining, 
which would prohibit unfair practices by both public employers 
and public employee organizations and would include duties of 
fair representation by the latter; and 
(6) settlement mechanisms providing for methods of per-
suasion by the agency such as mediation and factfinding upon the 
occurrence of a bargaining impasse dispute, but leaving to the 
state the resolution of whether to use binding interest arbitration, 
a limited right to strike, or some other fair and accommodating 
method including strike prohibitions with the right of the em-
ployer to act unilaterally upon reaching a good-faith bargaining 
impasse. 
A further suggestion to encourage continuing vitality in the 
standards would be to require the federal coordinating agency to 
review automatically and periodically the federal guidelines and, 
if need be, to facilitate "consensus refinement" of the minimum 
procedural standards in light of state experience and experimen-
tation. Also, depending on the constitutional approach used, as 
discussed below, the federal agency could supply technical assis-
tance and provide administrative grants to cover the financial 
obligations of implementing and administering the procedural 
standards. 
In sum, such minimum standards established in a framework 
of procedural requirements imposed on the states by federal regu-
lation, when combined with the right of the states to opt out 
under substantially conforming state legislation, would provide a 
fair and feasible accommodation of competing federal and state 
interests with minimum antagonism to the sovereign prerogatives 
of each. 
The minimum standards for labor regulations may be housed 
in a number of regulatory vehicles. As presented above, the stan-
dards could be promulgated by direct federal legislation with 
congressional authority cor.ting from the commerce clause, article 
I, section 8, clause 3, or tied to the spending power of article I, 
section 8, clause 1 in the form of conditions attached to federal 
contract or grant requirements and/or as part of a federal/state 
cooperative program, or lastly as appropriate legislation to imple-
ment the fourteenth amendment. A brief review of the constitu-
tionality of each approach using these minimum standards as the 
basis for federal regulation is discussed below. 
The most direct and comprehensive approach would be a 
federal statute based on the commerce power. The limitation on 
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that power after National League of Cities resides in the tenth 
amendment, which, by interpretation, holds that federal regula-
tion may not directly displace state choices over essential and 
integral state operations.267 The procedural nature of minimum 
standards obligations, when combined with the fact that no sub-
stantive decisions are mandated under the regulation, strongly 
suggests a conclusion that the ability of a state to function within 
a federal system would not be impaired and would not be there-
fore an unconstitutional invasion of state sovereignty. 
The constitutionality of the federal regulation is further sup-
ported by use of the balancing test espoused by Justice Black-
mun, as representative of the majority opinion in National 
League of Cities. 268 Under this test, the national interest in pro-
viding uniformity and certainty to collective bargaining arrange-
ments for public employees and minimizing labor unrest and 
strife arguably would outweigh state interests on the issues em-
bodied in the tenth amendment. Certainly such a conclusion is 
consistent with the rationale used in National League of Cities. 
Although such a holding cannot be a certainty in view of the 
precedent-shattering decision in that case, clearly a contrary 
holding would invite support for Justice Brennan's dissenting 
observation that it would appear to be "a transparent cover for 
invalidating a congressional judgment with which they disa-
gree."269 
A second approach for implementing the federal minimum 
standards is to condition certain federal funds on the adoption of 
such regulations, as authorized under the spending power of the 
Constitution. In some states, for example, those without enabling 
legislation for bargaining by public employees, this will necessi-
tate state statutory authorization by those states choosing to con-
tinue receiving the federal funds. A potential problem exists in 
that such an approach may not be comprehensive; for example, 
if the labor standards were tied to only federal procurement con-
tracts or grants, it is possible that many public employees would 
not be covered.270 .However, certain existing federal programs sug-
267. See notes 121-46 and accompanying text supra. 
268. 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
269. Id. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
270. However, by analogy to affirmative action requirements, it may be possible to 
affect noncontract employees at a particular state or local agency receiving the funds by 
requiring the government recipient to act affirmatively in its contractual commitments 
with all employees. See note 33 supra. 
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gest that a comprehensive system could be constructed either on 
a piecemeal basis tied to categorical or block grants by occupa-
tion, for example police under LEAA funding and highway em-
ployees under highway fund monies, as illustrated by the present 
collective bargaining program covering transit workers under the 
law regulating public urban mass transit systems.271 Or, such a 
system could be accomplished under a more ambitious program 
involving block grants such as revenue sharing, which reaches 
most state and local governments and already contains some 
labor standards provisions. 272 
A related approach involves creating a new statutory scheme 
modeled after the federal/state unemployment compensation 
program, recently made applicable to state and local govern-
ments.273 Such an approach must first devise and then provide an 
appropriate inducement to the states so they will choose to pass 
state legislation under the federal minimum standards guide-
lines. Perhaps a new and separate source of state generated reve-
nues could be tapped, which would provide the funding source for 
administering the program, or alternatively bonus federal mon-
ies, under related programs, e.g., under general revenue sharing, 
could be made available to those states adopting the minimum 
standards guidelines. Or a more negative approach could be used, 
and states could be penalized a certain percentage offederal mon-
ies under related programs for nonadoption of the guidelines.274 
Under any of the above-suggested programs constitutionally 
based on the spending power, the relevent legal standard in up-
holding conditions, such as the minimum standards provision, 
has been that they be reasonably related to a legitimate national 
end and be voluntarily agreed to by the states. 275 Though the 
Supreme Court in National League of Cities216 specifically re-
271. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra. An interesting point for argument 
might be whether such mass transit services are essential functions of a state. See text 
accompanying note 136 supra. 
272. See text accompanying notes 45-51 supra. 
273. See text accompanying notes 65-74 supra. 
274. See, e.g., where federal funds were impounded as a penalty for noncompliance 
with the Hatch Act and Highway Beautification Act respectively, Ohio v. United States 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ohio 1946), and Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. 
Supp. 606 (D. Vt. 1974). More recently, $ 76 million in federal monies have been withheld 
under the general revenue sharing program for noncompliance with anti-discrimination 
provisions. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977). 
275. See text accompanying notes 175-206 supra. 
276. 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17 (1976). 
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served judgment on the constitutional limits that may be im-
posed by the tenth amendment on the spending power, the same 
nonintrusive features of federal minimum standards guidelines 
discussed above should be sufficient in this context to permit the 
minimum standards condition to withstand judicial scrutiny and 
to be held an appropriate exercise of constitutional authority. 
The final approach for imposing federal regulations is to base 
the minimum standards on section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. As discussed earlier, there could be a problem in establish-
ing a sufficient justification under the equal protection require-
ment. 277 If such a justification could be found, perhaps in the 
disparity of bargaining rights between public and private employ-
ees under state law, then the constitutionality of federal mini-
mum standards is promising in view of the language used in 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 218 in which such power is called plenary and 
is not limited by state sovereignty. Also supportive of this argu-
ment are the lower court holdings subsequent to National League 
of Cities, upholding the Equal Pay and Age Discrimination in 
Employment Acts by narrowly construing that case and at the 
same time finding an appropriate constitutional basis under the 
fourteenth amendment.279 
In summary, it would appear that unless the Supreme Court 
would risk bringing to a halt many existing programs of the fed-
eral government, which directly and indirectly regulate the 
states, federal regulation of state and local government collective 
bargaining is constitutionally possible when housed in an appro-
priate regulatory scheme. The regulatory scheme that best keeps 
within the dictates of recent Supreme Court decisions provides 
federally mandated procedural guidelines which establish mini-
mum standards for the bargaining relationship between the pub-
lic employer and its employees. A desirable part of such a pro-
gram, which would also assist in its remaining constitutional, 
would be for the federal regulations to provide funds to cover the 
administrative costs of the state agency administering its law 
and, additionally, to permit the states to opt out if they adopt 
legislation in substantial conformity with the federal guidelines. 
Though many combinations of federal regulation, both direct 
and indirect, are possible, the program most likely to withstand 
277. See text accompanying notes 75-89 supra. 
278. 427 u.s. 445, 456 (1976). 
279. See text accompanying notes 207-226 supra. 
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judicial scrutiny would be one which is based on the spending 
power and which conditions the minimum procedural labor stan-
dards on a specific grant or a general grant such as revenue shar-
ing. If a more direct method of regulation is sought, the minimum 
standards could be embodied in a statute based additionally on 
the commerce power and fourteenth amendment, thus leaving as 
much leeway as possible for favorable judicial interpretation of 
the constitutional basis. 
It is hoped, though not expected, that the exploration and 
analysis in this article of the implications of the National League 
of Cities case and the constitutionality of federal laws regulating 
the states' labor relations will remove some of the recent mys-
tique which has inhibited discussion of the propriety of federal 
collective bargaining legislation, and that opponents and propo-
nents of such legislation can now leave the courts and return to 
Congress where the debate of such social and economic legislation 
is more appropriate. 
